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MORGAN THOMASt
A LITTLE-NOTICED circular from the Civil Service Commission last
December 13 1 heralded the end of one of the bitterest behind-the-
scenes fights Washington has seen in recent years. The controversy
dated back to June 11, 1946, when the American Bar Association's
efforts to make the Federal Government's regulatory processes more
"judicial" were realized in enactment of the Administrative Procedure
Act.2 It came to a head on March 11, 1949, when the Civil Service
Commission accepted the recommendations of a group which was
dominated by prominent American Bar Association members and
ordered the firing of over 25% of the hearing examiners then employed
by federal agencies. The December 13 circular in effect rescinded that
order and set aside almost everything the private group had done.
To understand the controversy it is necessary to review the role of the
hearing examiner under the Administrative Procedure Act. In general
the Act revised and made uniform throughout all federal agencies the
procedures for administrative hearings and decisions in both adjudica-
tion and rule-making. Integral to the new procedures was the creation
within each agency of a special corps of hearing examiners independent
of agency control of influence: only they could preside at formal hear-
ings and render initial decisions except in those infrequent instances
when agency members themselves performed those functions.
Since each agency previously had a staff of trial examiners which did
these things, the main change lay in the new independence which
hearing examiners were to have. To that end they were explicitly
made free of supervision by the investigatory, prosecuting, and ad-
ministrative staffs of their agencies; and in certain adjudications
they were even forbidden to consult ex parte with interested parties or
tAssistant Professor of Political Science, University of Michigan.
1. Civil Service Commission Departmental Circular No. 592, Supp. 3 (DC 592, S.3)
(December 13, 1949).
2. 60 STAT. 237, 5 U.S.C. § 1001 (1946). A short summary of previous attempts to
pass a bill on administrative procedure will be found in Admfnistrative Procedure Act,
Legislative History, SEx-. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 63-6 (1946). That the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act was in effect sponsored by the American Bar Association is
verified by this statement concerning S. 7, the bill which, vith some fey, changes based
on agency and other objections, became law as the Administrative Procedure Act: "S. 7
and H.R. 1203, introduced in the first session of the Seventy-ninth Congress, are similar
to S. 2030 and H.R. 5081, and represent the latest recommendations of the American
Bar Association for legislation to improve the administration of justice." Statement by
Mr. C. A. Miller, Chairman, American Bar Association Committee on Administrative
Law for the District of Columbia, Sam. Do. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1946).
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with investigating or prosecuting officials.' Within each agency cases
were generally to be rotated so that agency influence could not be
made effective through assignment of cases.4 Moreover, the Civil
Service Commission was entrusted with the broad powers which the
agencies themselves had previously exercised over their trial examiners.
Thus the Commission was given authority to prescribe examiners'
grades and salaries and to pass on promotions independently of agency
ratings or recommendations.' And an examiner could be removed
only if "good cause" were established at a Civil Service Commission
hearing.6
These provisions seem clear enough. But the wording of another
provision, that covering the initial selection of hearing examiners, gave
rise to two major ambiguities which have not yet been clarified over
three and a half years after passage of the Act. The provision, which
appears in Section 11 of the Administrative Procedure Act, was this:
"Subject to the civil-service . . . laws . . . there shall be ap-
pointed by and for each agency . . . qualifhd and competent ex-
aminers. . ....
The first question posed by this language was what part, if any, the
Civil Service Commission was to play in the selection of examiners.
Both the House and Senate Committees on the Judiciary explained
the words in identical terms:
"That examiners be 'qualified and competent' requires the Civil
Service Commission to fix appropriate qualifications and the
agencies to seek fit persons . . . iS]elf interest and due concern
for the proper performance of public functions will inevitably move
agencies to seek the highest type of examiners." I
Thus it appears that Congress intended the Commission merely to
draw up a set of general standards to be applied by the agencies in
determining whether particular applicants should be appointed. Yet a
diverse view was soon urged: that the Commission should go further
3. Administrative Procedure Act, Section 5(c) ; 5 U.S.C. § 1004(c) (1946).
4. Administrative Procedure Act, Section 11; 5 U.S.C. § 1010 (1946).
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid. The reasons for these provisions of Section 11 have been explained as fol-
lows: "The purpose of this section is to render examiners independent and secure in
their tenure and compensation. The section thus takes a different ground than the present
situation, in which examiners are mere employees of an agency, and other proposals for
a completely separate 'examiners' pool' from which agencies might draw for hearing
officers. Recognizing that the entire tradition of the Civil Service Commission is directed
toward security of tenure, it seems -wise to put that tradition to use in the present case."
Report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. 7, Sax. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1945), reprinted in Sax. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 215 (1946).
7. SEN. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 215,280 (1946).
[Vol. 59:4131
1950] SELECTION OF FEDERAL HEARING EXAMINERS 433
and determine whether each individual applicant was qualified, the
agencies being limited to making their selections from names submitted
by the Commission.
The second question was whether those who held trial examiner
jobs when the Act became effective and had given satisfactory per-
formance would have to requalify. A subordinate question was
whether those incumbents holding "war-service" or "temporary"
appointments should be treated the same as those with competitive
civil-service status.8 In other words, what differentiation was to be
made between three clearly defined groups-status incumbents, non-
status incumbents, and new applicants? On this score the congres-
sional history was silent. One view was that if Congress had intended
any screening of incumbents it would have said so. The job content
remained the same since, by the terms of the Act, trial examiner posi-
tions were automatically converted into hearing examiner positions.
By their actual performance the incumbents had demonstrated their
qualifications. And the legislative history contained no criticism of
the existing corps of trial examiners. The contrary view was that Con-
gress had, without saying so, in effect abolished all the old trial exam-
iner jobs, ordered those who held them to be fired, and created a whole
new set of jobs for which all comers must compete on equal terms. An
intermediate view was that the Commission could and should require
incumbents to requalify but should give some sort of preference to
those with competitive status.
Thus, while passage of the Administrative Procedure Act ended, at
least temporarily, the battle over regulatory procedure, an enticing
opportunity for affecting the administrative process now lay in the
selection of those who would apply it in the primary instance-the
hearing examiners. The opportunity was not disregarded.
THE STORY OF THE QUALIFYING PROCESS
The Civil Service Commission proceeded very slowly. Under the
Act the selection of the hearing examiners was not to become effective
until one year after the Act was approved, namely June 11, 1947. The
Commission's first official act was to appoint an advisory committee
to aid in drafting rules for the selection, classification, promotion, and
8. These were all men who had received status under the provisions of the Rams-
peck Act of November 26, 1940, '"_xtending the Classified Executive Civil Service of the
United States," 54 STAT. 1211, 5 U.S.C. §§ 631 (a), 631(b), 632, 635, 669, 6S1-4 (1946),
and Exec. Order No. 8743, April 23, 1941, 5 CoDE FED. REcs. 927 (Cunt Supp. 1943)
issued pursuant thereto, by which incumbents of attorney positions were granted civil
service status. These incumbents had thus served prior to March 16, 1942, after which
date, under War Service Regulations issued by the Commission pursuant to F-e. Order
No. 9063, Feb. 16, 1942, 1 CoDE FED. REas. 1091 (Cum. Supp. 1943), only "%ar-service"
appointments were made.
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removal of hearing examiners. The advisory committee consisted of
agency personnel with the exception of Carl McFarland, first Chairman
of the Section of Administrative Law of the American Bar Association.'
Mr. McFarland was the representative of the leadership of the Amer-
ican Bar Association. He had been instrumental in securing the passage
of the Administrative Procedure Act, and he had urged in 1945 that
the Association follow closely and attempt to control the implementa-
tion of any administrative procedure act which might be passed."o In
line with this plan, the American Bar Association Journal commended
the selection of Mr. McFarland for the advisory committee and coun-
selled that "a high responsibility of the organized Bar will be to follow
closely all developments as to the selection of . . . examiners. . ... 11
The Association's attitude towards the incumbents could be easily
gleaned from several articles printed in the American Bar Association
Journal.12 Typical was an article which included with warm approval
the following quotation of a letter to Civil Service Commissioner
Arthur S. Flemming from Senator Wiley, who became Chairman of
the Senate Judiciary Committee when the Eightieth Congress con-
vened in 1947:
"It seems to me that the burden of proof is on the United States
Civil Service Commission that these hearings [sic] examiners will
not be men of leftist thinking, men who don't have complete loy-
alty to our constitutional system of checks and balances, men who
are not devoted to our system of private enterprise .... I shall be
looking for substantial proof that the Civil Service Commission is
going to fill these quasi-judicial posts with men of the highest un-
impeachable caliber of the legal profession available, rather than
with men who simply have occupied similar positions in the Federal
Government today, who largely are of one party and who may lack
the approach of private enterprise in their work." 13
On May 29, 1947, on the assumption that Section 11 of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act would become effective on June 11, 1947, the
9. The other members were: 3. Haden Alldredge, Interstate Commerce Commis-
sioner; W. Carroll Hunter, Solicitor of the Department of Agriculture; F. C. Baggarly,
Chief Trial Examiner of the Federal Trade Commission; and Herbert A, Bergson, Chief
Legal Consultant in the Office of the Assistant Solicitor General, Department of Justice.
10. Mr. McFarland's Special Committee on Administrative Law reported that "the
legislation which may be secured could be wasted in large part by the failure of the
Association to make provision for adequate follow-up.... Special attention should also
be given to the examiner system, both in personnel and operation. . . ." "Business and
industry generally, when proposals for administrative powers and legislation arise, by
nature confine themselves to questions as to whether or not the powers should be con-
ferred or the subject regulated at all." These quotations are from the Sup plcinental Rc-
port of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, 70 A.B.A. REP. 272, 273-4 (1945).
11. 33 A.B.AJ. 1 (1947).
12. See id. at 213; id. at 421.
13. Id. at 422.
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Civil Service Commission issued its first regulation pertaining to hear-
ing examiners. This regulation allowed the agencies to make condi-
tional reappointments of incumbents of positions that were hearing
examiner positions under the Administrative Procedure Act.14 Pur-
suant to this regulation, the agencies "conditionally reappointed"
their one hundred and ninety-seven incumbent hearing examiners. 15
Shortly thereafter the Civil Service Commission announced to the
agencies that no personnel action could be taken in regard to hearing
examiners without permission of the Civil Service Commission.I
Alarmed by these decisions Senator Wiley wrote another letter to
Commissioner Arthur S. Flemming dated June 20, 1947, also reprinted
in the Americar Bar Association Journal:
"[Clertain very disturbing allegations have been communicated
to me to the effect that the Commission may pursue a course during
the period when Congress may not be in session which it would not
otherwise pursue were the Congress still at hand in Washington.
. . . As you know, I have shared the intense concern of the Amer-
ican Bar Association that the Hearing Examiners ultimately con-
firmed for the new posts might consist largely or exclusively of an
entrenched 'palace guard' of former Examiners and/or of individ-
uals having an approach inimical to the welfare of private enter-
prise." 17
On June 28, 1947, the Commission published Proposed Regulations
for the appointment, compensation, and removal of hearing examiners
and gave notice of a public hearing on them. s The public hearing was
14. The regulation, issued as Part 34 of its Rules and Regulations, read as follows:
"Part 34-Appointment, compensation and removal of hearing ex-aminers.
"Section 34.1 as set out below is hereby added to the regulations in Part 34.
"Section 34.1 Conditional re-appointment of hearing examiners. Pending promulga-
tion of final regulations by the Commission, incumbents of positions that are hearing
examiner positions on June 11, 1947, may be re-appointed conditionally on that date. Any
eligibility for permanent appointments of incumbents that may be granted in the final
regulations shall be based on the status of incumbents on June 11, 1947 (Section 11, C0
Stat. 244; 5 U.S.C. Supp. 1010).' 12 FED. REG. 3507 (1947).
Also, Civil Service Commission Departmental Circular No. 592 (DC 592) (June 3,
1947) was sent to heads of departments and independent establishments to inform them of
this personnel action, ie., the conditional re-appointment of hearing examniners.
15. 64 Civn. SERvicE Cosmmssiox ArNx. RE. 30 (1947). The Civil Service Com-
mission's resort to this formula of "conditional reappointment" was an attempt to fore-
close the argument that any incumbent allowed to continue in his job after June 11, 1947
automatically became entitled to the protection of the removal provision of Section 11
(5 U.S.C. § 1010) whether or not an official absolute appointment had been given to
the incumbents.
16. Civil Service Commission Departmental Circular No. 592, Supp. 1 (DC 592,
S.1) (June 18, 1947).
17. 33 A.B.AJ. 689 (1947).
18. 12 FED. REG. 4233 (1947).
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held on July 9, 1947; and on September 23, 1947, the Commission
promulgated its Final Regulations. 19
The Proposed Regulations mentioned that qualifications examina-
tions would be conducted by a Board of Examiners "as a section within
the Examining and Placement Division" of the Commission to consist
of three members, of which only one was to be an employee of the
Commission.20 This provision was omitted in the Final Regulations,
but in an accompanying statement the Commission made known that
for rating incumbents with civil service status a Board of Examiners
with at least two experts in administrative law from outside the gov-
ernment would develop standards and rate status incumbents on the
manner in which they had discharged their duties.2' This was the
first public announcement that the rating board would include mem-
bers from outside the government, that it would have considerable dis-
cretionary authority to formulate rating standards, and that the board
would function like a committee of expert examiners apart from the
Civil Service Commission's regular personnel examining staff.
The American Bar Association Journal was prompt in noting its
approval of this set-up and it reported that Mr. McFarland, as its
member on the advisory committee, had accomplished a "signal vic-
tory" in regard to the Final Regulations. In an article entitled "Vic-
tory As To The Hearing Examiners: Association's Contentions Sus-
tained As To New Rules," the Journal reported it in these words:
"Of the nine principal points made in behalf of our Association
by way of objection to the draft of rules on which the Commis-
sion's hearing of July 9 was held, the Commission sustained eight
in full and adopted as to the ninth a compromise which will need
to be watched carefully as to the manner in which it is carried out
but cannot be said to contravene the mandates or the intent of the
Act. Qualified 'outsiders' will not be placed on a parity with in-
cumbent Examiners as to rating for appointment, but the present
Examiners will be subjected to rigorous investigation, with an ex-
amination by an independent board of 'outsiders.'
"This signal victory on eight items and substantial victory on
19. 12 FED. REG. 6321 (1947) ;'FEDERAL PERSONNEL MAITUAL, c. 21, Part 34. These
Final Regulations may also be found in 5 CoDE FED. REG. 409-14 (Supp. 1947) and 5
CODE FED. REG. 185-90 (1949 ed).
20. § 34.3, 12 FED. REG. 4233 (1947).
21. The accompanying statement of September 23, 1947, announced this on page 2 as
follows: "The Commission will establish a Board of Examiners to be made up of one
person now on the Commission's staff and at least two persons from outside the govern-
ment who have an outstanding reputation in the field of administrative law .... In accord-
ance with standards to be developed by the Board, the Commission will make a complete
qualifications investigation of the incumbents [with competitive status] to determine the
manner in which they have discharged their duties and responsibilities in the positions
now held by them as well as in previous positions." (Emphasis added).
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the ninth was not won without a great deal of work against strong
opposition which at times seemed likely to have its way in the new
rules. Carl McFarland, of our Association, as the non-governmental
member of the Commission's Advisory Committee 'stuck to his
guns' for many months in urging our Association's contentions.
Chairman Wiley of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary made
his interest and concern very clear to the Commission and the
agencies., 22
In brief, the Final Regulations made civil service rules and regula-
tions applicable to hearing examiners and provided additional restric-
tions on any agency action concerning hearing e.xaminers.2 3 Incum-
bents with civil service status had to pass a non-competitive examina-
tion with a score of 70 in order to be eligible for an absolute appoint-
ment as a hearing examiner. 24 However, the Civil Service Commission
announced that "only those [status] incumbents who in the judgment
of the Board [of Examiners] are eminently qualified to carry on the
duties of hearing examiners will receive absolute appointments to such
positions." 25
Incumbents without civil service status, like new applicants, would
have to pass an open competitive examination and obtain a score
within reach of certification from a competitive ranked register of
eligibles for each pay grade.
The Announcement for Examination for Hearing Examiner was
issued on October 21, 1947.21 It divided the experience requirement
into general and specialized with correspondingly fewer years of gen-
eral experience and more years of specialized experience required for
22. 33 A.B.A.J. 861 (1947).
23. Thus, all appointments had to have the prior approval of the Commission with
regard to qualifications and status (§ 34.4) ; promotions, reassignments, transfers and re-
instatements had to be generally on a competitive basis §§ 34.5, 34.6); v.ithin-grade
salary advancements would be made without the use of agency efficiency ratings (§§ 34.7,
34.8) ; and removals could be made only after the Commission had determined that good
cause existed upon the basis of the record of a hearing (§ 34.11). See note 19 mspra.
24. For a detailed e-planation of the regulations, see Civil Service Departmental
Circular No. 592, Supp. 2 (November 5, 1947) (hereafter cited as DC 592, S.2).
25. Emphasis added. DC 592, S2, p. , and statement accompanying Final Regula-
tions, p. 2. These releases also explained briefly the procedure for the qualifications deter-
mination for status incumbents. The incumbent would file a statement of his previous
training and experience; a qualifications investigation would be made by means of per-
sonal interviews with persons qualified to give information relative to the incumbents;
incumbents would be required to appear before the Board of Examiners for an oral inter-
view; and the Board of Examiners would make the ratings.
26. Civil Service Commission Examining Circular No. 17 (Oct. 21, 1947) (here-
after cited as EC-17).
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each higher grade of position.- General experience was mainly legal
work in some field in which government regulation is conducted through
the device of hearings. Specialized experience involved legal work as a
judge, or in a governmental regulatory body, or in practice before a
governmental regulatory body or court of record. Along with the
Proposed Rules had been issued a tentative Examination Announce-
ment which set forth requirements of qualifying experience for the
position of hearing examiner. The American Bar Association Journal
objected strenuously to one type of specialized qualifying experience.
"[This] proposes to count as required experience 'administra-
tive charge or responsibility for the successful completion of cases
conducted before a court of record or governmental regulatory
body.' So far as this opens the door to appointments from among
people whose experience has been the 'administrative charge . . .
of cases conducted before a . . . governmental regulatory body'
it would include persons who are expediters, coordinators, paper-
pushers and the like who are hardly more than chief clerks or polit-
ical supervisors and are without real professional experience orqualifitation." 28
Under the section of the Announcement entitled "Basis of Ratings,"
ten different rating factors were set forth without indication of what
weight each would carry. Eight of them dealt generally with legal or
judicial ability. One dealt with "diversity of experience in legal pro-
ceedings of the type described above." The other dealt with "knowl-
edge and experience in the technical subject-matter field involved in
the position." A specific overall requirement was that "applicants
must also show conclusively that they are persons of judicial tempera-
ment and poise." 29 By number alone, then, these rating factors
stressed the importance of general legal and judicial qualities in prefer-
ence to specialized economic and legal knowledge of a subject-matter
field of regulation.
The membership of the Board of Examiners for Hearing Examiner
27. The following experience table was included in the Announcement:
EXPERIENCE REQUIREMENT TAam
Grade of Amount of Experience
Position Total General Special
P-8 6 - 6
P-7 6 - 6
P-6 6 1 5
P-5 6 2 4
P-4 6 3 3
This entailed ratings for each of the five grades of positions and therefore five separate
registers applying to all agencies of the government using hearing examiners.
28. 33 A.B.AJ. 863 (1947).
29. EC-17 at 1.
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Personnel which was to function pursuant to the terms of the An-
nouncement and the Civil Service Commission's regulations was finally
announced on January 23, 1948. 0 The Board consisted of six persons.
Two were state supreme court judges; one was an employee of the
Civil Service Commission; and three were practicing attorneys who
had held high posts in the American Bar Association. 31
As the Board of Examiners was beginning to process the applica-
tions from incumbents with civil service status, in May, 1948, its func-
tion of making qualifications determinations was extended to include
non-status incumbents and non-incumbent applicants.32 This additional
function included the rating of qualified eligibles for a ranked register,
because these applicants were subjected to a competitive examination.
The original six members of the Board of Examiners took on the task
of qualifying and rating the non-status incumbents; but for non-
30. See 34 AB.AJ. 179 (1948). The group so appointed have alvays referred to
themselves as "consultants," although the Civil Service Commission has referred to them
as the Board of Examiners for Hearing Examiner Personnel. They will be called the
Board of Examiners in this article.
31. The two judges were Douglas L. Edmonds of California and Laurance If. Hyde
of Missouri. The Commission employee was Wilson Mf. Matthews. The three attorneys
were Carl McFarland, Chairman of the American Bar Association's Committee on Ad-
ministrative Law, 1941-46, and a member of the Minority Group on the Attorney
General's Committee on Administrative Procedure; Joseph NV. Henderson, former Presi-
dent of the American Bar Association, 1943-44; and Willis Smith, former President of
the American Bar Association, 1945-46. The American Bar Association Journal noted
that judge Edmonds comes from "a state which separates examiners completely from the
agencies," 34 A.B.AJ. 179 (1948). But neither of the judges had applied federal admin-
istrative law. Mr. Smith is the senior partner in the law firm of Smith, Leach & Ander-
son in Raleigh, North Carolina, whose clients include Armour and Company, and Inter-
national Paper Company, which have been extensively involved in litigation before ad-
ministrative agencies. Mr. Henderson is a member of the firm of Rawle & Henderson in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. His firm has represented the following concerns in cases
before the NLRB: Republic Steel Corporation, Southern Steamship Corporation, and
Berkshire Knitting Mills. While acting as a member of the Board of Fxaminers, Mr.
Henderson was counsel for American Manufacturing Company in a proceeding in a
regional office of the NLRB. Mr. McFarland, the Chairman of the Board of Examiners,
is connected with the law firm of McFarland & Sellers in Washington, D.C. He recently
has been chief counsel for the National Association of Manufacturers in the case to
challenge the constitutionality of the Regulation of Lobbying Act: NAM v. Clark pend-
ing before the District Court of the District of Columbia. (Case #381-48). The firm
represents a number of Stock Yards Companies before the Department of Agriculture.
Mr. Ashley Sellers, Mr. McFarland's partner, was for many years in the Solicitor's
Office of the Department of Agriculture and was later Assistant War Food Adminis-
trator. Its clients are mostly from business firms, although Mr. McFarland has acted for
some Railway Brotherhoods in injunction proceedings.
32. FIRST REPoaT OF THE CONSULTArTS TO THE U.S. Crvm Snnvicn Couz ssion,
Hearing Examiner Personnel under the Administrative Procedure Act 6, (Jan. 31, 1949).
(Hereafter cited as FrST REPORT OF THE CoxsuLTANs.) This report is reprinted in
95 CoxG. IEc A1567-A1571 (March 16, 1949).
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incumbent applicants, the Civil Service Commission, "on the recom-
mendations of the original group of consultants," 11 appointed nine
associates, each to act in the several regions of the country as a single
personnel examiner for the non-incumbent applicants in his region. 4
Each member of this group of associates functioned as a preliminary
grader of applicants in his area, on the basis of the applicant's state-
ment of his qualifications and of an oral interview. Thereupon, these
associates informed the Board of Examiners as to "their judgment and
findings in each case either by mail or orally at the November-Decem-
ber 1948 meeting. All such cases were either discussed with, or care-
fully reconsidered on the paper record by, regular consultant members
of the group." 35
For incumbents, the Board of Examiners recommended, and the
Civil Service Commission approved, that open competitive standards
would be used in examining all hearing examiners whether or not they
had civil service status.36 Thus, all incumbents were to be treated
essentially alike in the qualifying process; and in the spring of 1948,
regular Civil Service Commission personnel investigators were used to
build up a record of opinions about the incumbents. These qualifica-
tions investigators were lawyers. How widely they consulted the
references (listed by the incumbents) and other persons who at that
time or in the past had supervised the incumbents is not known.3 7
33. FrST REPORT OF THE CONSULTANTS 7.
34. These associates are listed in the FiasT REPORT OF THE CONSULTANTS as follows:
"Albert Ewing of Nashville, Tennessee, delegate of his state to the governing body
of the American Bar Association, for part of the South; Chester T. Lane of New York
City, former general counsel of the Securities and Exchange Commission, for New York
and New Jersey; Clarence A. Miller, of Washington, D.C., vice-president and general
counsel of the American Short Line Railroad Association, for the District of Columbia,
Maryland, Virginia, and West Virginia; Morris Mitchell, practicing attorney of Mill-
neapolis, for Wisconsin, Minnesota, North Dakota, and South Dakota; Charles B.
Stephens of Springfield, Illinois, executive secretary of the Illinois State Bar Association,
for Illinois and Indiana; Robert G. Storey of Dallas, Texas, Dean of the Law School of
Southern Methodist University and president of the Texas State Bar Association, for
Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas; and Glenn R. Winters of Ann Arbor, Michigan,
secretary-treasurer of the American Judicature Society, for Michigan. In addition, Chief
Justice Carl V. Weygandt of the Supreme Court of Ohio and Associate Justice John V.
Spaulding of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts agreed to cooperate in the
same work on an entirely informal basis with respect to applicants from their respective
states. The original group of six consultants have aided in the regional work at their
places of residence."
35. FRsT REPORT OF THE CONSULTANTS 16.
36. 65 Civw. SERvicE CommIssioN ANN. REP. 32 (1948).
37. The NLRB trial examiners allege that Judge J. Warren Madden of the Court
of Claims, a former NLRB chairman, and Mr. Frank Bloom, a former Chief Trial Ex-
aminer of the NLRB, who were given as references by many of the incumbents, were not
consulted by the Civil Service Commission investigators. The writer has also been told
that the investigators reached all witnesses who would be productive, and, undoubtedly,
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Statements concerning the qualifications of the incumbent examiners
were not obtained under oath and were made in confidence2 s These
qualifications investigations were sent to the Board of Examiners,
which then organized itself into panels of usually three members to
give oral interviews and make ratings.39
The qualifying and rating decisions of the Board were completed
in meetings during November and December, 1948, and sent to the
Civil Service Commission. Every action of the consultant group was,
of course, theoretically subject to review and revision by the Com-
mission. It was understood all along, however, that such would not be
the case to the extent that matters of judgment in individual cases
was involved. 40 And, in fact, the Commission did not review the Board
of Examiners' decisions but merely translated them into its official
action.
41
at least the incumbents' present superiors were consulted. In the NLRB the incumbents'
superiors would be NLRB members and the Chief Trial Examiner and not the General
Counsel and his prosecuting staff who are now separated from the judicial side of the
NLRB. See Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 SrAT. 139 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 153(d) (Supp. 1948). However, the present General Counsel, who was formerly a trial
examiner, and others on his staff also were most likely consulted.
38. The Civil Service Commission refuses as a consistent policy to release these
statements or the names of the informants. "Because of its [Civil Service Commission's]
lack of the subpoena power, the Commission must, in developing information, rely to a
great extent on statements made as confidential disclosures. In such cases the Commis-
sion does not disclose either the evidence or the identity of the source of information.
Anonymous statements are not considered as evidence and are given no weight in the
decision." F.DnAL PRSONN-. MANUAL, c. AS, p. 4.
39. Mr. Matthews, who participated in all but one of the oral interviews, and Mr.
McFarland were most frequently members of these panels. This information was sup-
plied by a staff member of the Civil Service Commission. Board members stated that they
disqualified themselves in cases in which they felt they might be prejudiced or partial.
FIRST REPORT OF rHRE CoNSuLTANTS 14.
According to affidavits later filed with the Commission, the interviews were in the
nature of cross-examination, and the integrity of the "old NLRB"--i.c., pre-Taft-Hartley
Board-seemed as much on trial as the capacities of the individual examiners. The
disqualified NLRB trial examiners have objected to Mr. Henderson's participation in
the panels interviewing them. Since Mr. Henderson or his firm had several complaint
cases before the NLRB, it has been asserted that he was in the position of a counsel for
disappointed litigants and hence was prejudiced against NLRB personnel. Mr. Henderson
did not disqualify himself in voting on at least some of the NLRB incumbents whom he
questioned at the oral interview.
40. FmsT REPoRT OF THE CoNSULTANTs 23.
41. In the case of those persons who were to be placed on competitive registers (i.e.
non-status incumbents and new applicants) the Commission's staff converted the Board's
letter ratings into numerical scores and added the preference points to which veterans
were entitled. Each non-status incumbent who was rated eligible was to have an oppor-
tunity to be appointed, if the lowest numerical rating reached in the regular order of
certification did not exceed his numerical rating by more than five points. This was in
accord with the operation of the Civil Service Commission's Regulation 3.107(a) (2),
FaDE.AL PERSONNEL MANUAL, C. ZI, Part 3 (FPM, Z1-221).
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THE RESULTS OF THE EXAMINATIONS
On March 11, 1949, the results were announced. Status incumbents
were first found either ineligible or eligible. If held ineligible, they were
told why in one or both of two phrases: (1) "Overall Characteristics"
or (2) "Lack of Sufficient Specialized Experience." Those found
eligible could immediately be given absolute appointments by their
agencies. Non-status incumbents and applicants 42 found eligible were
given ratings ranging from 70 to 100 (or higher because of the addition
of veterans' preference points) and then ranked in order on registers
for five different pay grades.
41
Of the 212 incumbents rated, 44 54, or 25.5 per cent, were found dis-




Status Incumbents 148 42 28.4%
Non-Status Incumbents 64 12 18.7%
Total 212 54 25.5%
Table II, below, lists the agencies which had the largest percentages
of absolutely disqualified incumbents.
In addition to the absolutely disqualified incumbents some in-
cumbents were rated eligible only for lower grades than those they
were holding-in effect accomplishing a demotion. Others holding
war service or temporary appointments were rated eligible, but with
numerical grades such as 71 or 72, which would put them at the bottom
of the register of eligibles where they could not be reached on certifica-
tion under the procedure of taking from the top of the register. Still
others were rated eligible but at grades which were below the classifica-
tion range of the agency in which they worked. For example, while the
42. Only the cases of non-incumbent applicants received prior to November, 1948,
had been rated by the Board of Examiners.
43. Fifty-two non-status incumbents and 212 non-incumbent applicants were placed
in rank order on the five registers of eligibles. From the statistics released by the Board
of Examiners, 61.5 per cent of the eligibles who were non-status incumbents and 78 per
cent of the eligibles who were non-incumbent applicants received scores of better than
80. No statistics have been released which would show the relative standings of the in-
cumbents and of the non-incumbents on the registers, because the Civil Service Commis-
sion has generally pursued its policy of releasing neither the names or the scores of the
eligibles (except to each individual concerned).
44. Five additional trial examiners (recent appointments) were serving in the Fed-
eral Government at the time but their cases had not been completed. See Finsr Rrour
OF TaE CoNsUTrANTrs 18 n.
[Vol. 59.431
1950] SELECTION OF FEDERAL HEARING EXAMINERS 443
TABLE II
Number Percentage
Total In- " Dis- Dis- Non-
Agency cumbents qualified qualified Status Status
U. S. Maritime
Commission 5 3 60% 3
Department of
Agriculture 5 3 60% 2 1
NLRB 41 14 34% 8 6
Civil Aero-
nautics Board 30 10 33Y% 7 3
Interstate Com-
merce Commission 48 12 25% 12
Treasury 17 4 23Y% 4
qualifying range in the NLRB is from P-6 to P-, three examiners
were rated eligible, but only at P-4 or P-5. This decision in effect
blocked their continued employment by that agency.
In the National Labor Relations Board, used as a case-study, the
results for the 27 incumbents whose services antedated the Taft-
Hartley Act are shown in the following table:
TABLE III
Number found wholly unqualified at any grade (S status, 6 non-
status) ................................................. 14
Number found qualified but at a grade below the NLRB's classi-
fication range ........................................... 3
Number found qualified for placement on competitive register, but
given scores so low as probably to preclude their appointment... 4
Number found qualified for grades within NLRB's classification
range, but demoted one or two grades ....................... 5
Number found qualified at grade then held .................... 1
27
Thus 26 of the 27 with longest service were adversely affected. Over a
period of years most of these 26 had received high efficiency ratings
from the NLRB; in fact, of the 14 found wholly unqualified, 9 had re-
ceived a rating of "Excellent," the highest rating possible. These
melancholy results for the pre-Taft-Hartley Act hearing examiners
were a striking contrast to the success of those examiners who had
received temporary appointments after the passage of the Taft-
Hartley Act on June 23, 1947. Of the twelve in this latter group,
eleven were rated eligible by the Board of Examiners.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
On the same day the results were announced, the Commission gave
the regulatory agencies until June 25, 1949 to displace all incumbent
examiners who had been found ineligible or who had not received rat-
ings high enough to come within certification from the registers." It
also informed the agencies and the disqualified incumbents that they
had 10 days within which to file an administrative appeal. Such an
appeal, it was stated, should in each case set forth in full why the ap-
pellant was qualified and what factors were given inadequate con-
sideration in the unfavorable decision.
APPEALS
The first step in an appeal from a civil service examination is in the
nature of a rehearing before the Board of Examiners." If its decision
is again unfavorable, there is a further appeal to the Commission's
Board of Appeals and Review, which conducts a hearing de novo.41
And in the Commission's discretion there may be a subsequent appeal
to the Commission itself."
Every affected agency noted an appeal on behalf of its examiners.
In one form or another all asserted that a review of their examiners'
records convinced them that the examiners were fully qualified to
retain their jobs. The NLRB's letter said in part:
"The action has eviscerated the hearing examiner staff at a time
when its case load is singularly great. 14 out of 28 members of the
agency's old and experienced staff, including both status and war
service incumbents have been rejected. The Board will be unable
efficiently to pursue its regular operations without the services of
these trained men, many of whom have been with the Board for
over a decade." 41
Meanwhile the NLRB examiners who were ruled ineligible or other-
45. General Displacement Notice No. 27, March 11, 1949. The effective date of this
displacement order was indefinitely extended on May 23, 1949, by Supplement No. 1.
The plan of certification to be used was a so-called Plan B (FEDERAL PERSONNEL MAN-
UAii c. R2, p. 26), under which each agency could submit requests for incumbent eligi-
bles to be earmarked for certification. The names of these earmarked employee eligibles
whose ratings came within reach of certification would thus be included in the certificates
issued to that agency.
46. FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL, c. A5.
47. Ibid. Whether or not the Civil Service Commission's adjective regulations in
the FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL make the Board of Appeals and Review an independent
tribunal in its appellate function is not clear. Cf. FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL, c. A5-4
and the latest revision of § 01.8 of the organizational regulations of the Commission. 12
FED. REG. 1271 (1947) ; 5 CODE FED. REG. § 01.8 (Supp. 1947).
48. FEDERAX" PERSONNEL MANUA, c. AS. -
49. The NLRB appeal is entitled "Notice of Agency Request for Reconsideration
and Appeal," dated March 24, 1949.
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wise adversely affected banded together to secure common counsel
for their individual appeals." These counsel wrote the Commission
that it was a logical impossibility to meet the appellate requirement of
stating which factors were given inadequate consideration in each case
when they did not even know in what respects each examiner had been
found wanting. Counsel joined the NLRB in asking for Bills of Par-
ticulars. Where "Overall Characteristics" was the offense, what did it
really mean in each instance? Where "Lack of Sufficient Specialized
Experience" was crucial, what experience was counted as specialized
and what was not? In the interests of due process both the NLRB
and the examiners' lawyers also insisted on an extension beyond the
Commission's 10-day limit within which to present whatever evidence
might turn out to be relevant. The appellants' past superiors, it was
noted, were scattered from Germany to California. Finally they asked
that incumbents be permitted to stay on the job until their appeals
had been decided.
As a result of these letters the Civil Service Commission's staff pre-
pared, on the basis of the investigator's record of each disqualified in-
cumbent, a statement entitled: "Basis of Findings." 11 These state-
ments were somewhat more specific than the individual notices of
ratings. They did say what experience had not been credited as "spe-
cialized." And for "Overall Characteristics" they substituted terms
such as "lack of fairness," "arbitrariness," "immaturity," "lack of
judicial temperament and poise," and "biased in certain respects."
The NLRB immediately wrote the Civil Service Commission that it
did not consider these statements the adequate Bills of Particulars it
had requested. The Commission at this time suspended its June 25
deadline and agreed that no incumbent should be dismissed until his
appeal had been disposed ofA2
On April 18, 1949, to find out how reconsideration by the Board ot
Examiners would proceed, a meeting with Mr. McFarland, Chairman
of the Board, and Civil Service Commission officers, was arranged for
representatives of all affected agencies and counsel for the appellant
examiners. Mr. McFarland stated that for the purposes of the re-
50. It was their feeling that their mutual interest in the principle involved as wel
as their individual concern in the actions of the Board of Examiners merited an arrange-
ment for pooling counsel's fee and an agreement that the expenses of appeals, until all
remedies had been exhausted, should be borne equally by all in the agreement regardless
of whether they were given eligibility or a higher score or grade at an earlier stage in
the proceedings. Attorneys Charles A. Horsky and John IL Thompson (now on the
faculty of the Yale Law School) of the law firm of Covington, Burling, Rublee, O'Brian
& Shorb reviewed the facts and then agreed to act as counsel for a nominal fee.
51. Thus the statements were in the nature of short briefs prepared by persons who
had not participated in the Board of Examiners' decisions.
52. The Directors of Personnel of the various agencies were so informed by letters
from the Commission.
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consideration proceedings it was unnecessary to ask for hundreds of
letters asserting the competence and freedom from bias of the incum-
bents who had been disqualified. Such letters, he said, would invite
undue publicity and would probably not meet the issues which had
in fact been determinative. It was then arranged to have a separate
preliminary conference for each agency. At each Mr. McFarland would
tell a representative from the agency and counsel for its appellants
what was "really wrong" with each examiner and what additional
information would be useful. The NLRB's conference was arranged
for May 11, 1949.
At that conference the cases of the fourteen totally disqualified
NLRB examiners were discussed. Mr. McFarland informed counsel
that the Civil Service Commission had suggested a more lenient stand-
ard on reconsideration-and that nine of the fourteen disqualified
NLRB incumbents would just be called in for reinterview and then
rated eligible. Then he went into what was "wrong" with the other
five. This was mostly a matter of "over-all characteristics," such as
bias in favor of labor and lack of judicial temperament, and lack of
specialized experience. The experience problem grew out of the fact
that the Board of Examiners had ruled out work in various jobs under
the pre-Taft-Hartley NLRB-such as associate attorney in the Trial
Examining Division (a kind of apprentice trial examiner); attorney
in the Enforcement Section, which briefed and argued cases taken to
court; attorney in the Review Section, which analyzed intermediate
reports of trial examiners and recommended their adoption or rejec-
tion by the NLRB itself; and confidential legal assistant to an NLRB
member. 53
Mr. McFarland instructed counsel that their only job was to have
appellants ready for reinterviews starting on May 16. Although he did
mention that the current opinions of NLRB members would be helpful
to the Board of Examiners, he added that a commission investigator
would attend to that.54 Counsel further asked for a stenographic re-
port and the presence of counsel at the reinterviews. Both requests
were denied.
53. The interpretation given to the specialized experience requirement will be treated
at pages 464-8 infra.
54. Of course the NLRB was already on record in its appeal, Meanwhile a Civil
Service Commission investigator went to the NLRB, but the members were not able to
see him, and the investigator did not question them until the results of the reconsider-
ation were announced.
The reasons why the NLRB members were not questioned by the Civil Service
Commission investigator (at this time one year after the original qualifications investiga-
tion) is a severely contested point on which the writer has heard extremely contradictory
explanations. Although it is important because of the fact that allegedly the qualifications
evaluation of the appellants differed in the two investigators' reports of a year apart,
the writer has not been able to determine to his satisfaction the reason for the delay in
obtaining the interviews with the NLRB members.
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Meanwhile, counsel for the disqualified examiners decided to attack
the validity of the proceedings conducted by the Board of Examiners.
Motions to the effect that the Board of Examiners was without author-
ity in examining incumbents were filed with the Civil Service Com-
mission. A separate supporting memorandum of counsel for the NLR13
examiners also alleged in detail economic and religious bias on the part
of the Board of Examiners. 51 In addition, it was requested that the
Commission make available the data used by the Board of Examiners
in making its determinations and provide for a full, legal hearing on
reconsideration with a stenographic transcript and the right to sup-
poena, confront and cross-examine witnesses.t"
The three members of the Civil Service Commission heard oral argu-
ments on these motions on May 6, 1949. Answering the contentions
then advanced, the Civil Service Commission in an informal note to
counsel stated that the procedure was the usual one for new positions
and that it was not convinced that any irregularities had occurred.
The note from the Civil Service Commission to the NLRB counsel
reserved the matter of bias and prejudice but asked for affidavits
thereon. On May 17, 1949, counsel submitted a memorandum and
twenty affidavits expanding on the bias and prejudice charge. No
answer to this memorandum was received until after the reconsidera-
tion proceedings were completed by the Board of Examiners. It was
not until just prior to the subsequent appeal proceedings before the
Board of Appeals and Review that President Harry Mitchell gave ex-
pression to the Commission view of this charge. In a letter to the
counsel he said that the Board of Appeals and Review would be alert
55. This was subsequently broadened to include charges of nepotism and favoritism.
It was also alleged that several members of the Board were disqualified by reason of
contemporaneous activities in cases against the United States (or in which the United
States was interested) in apparent violation of §§ 281 and 283 of new Title 18 of the
United States Code. It asserted that these proceedings against the incumbent examiners
were in effect removal proceedings and not carried on according to the requirements of
the Administrative Procedure Act. It asserted that there was no legal authority for the
appointment of a Board of Examiners consisting of persons outside of official federal
service and that the Board of Examiners had performed functions not legally delegated
to it by the Civil Service Commission and had deviated from its basic instructions in the
terms of the Announcement for Examination for the position of Hearing Examiner.
Finally it was charged that the Board completely departed from traditionally fair stand-
ards for rating personnel.
56. The following counsel joined in these motions, filed April 27, 1949, to the Civil
Service Commission: Charles Fahy for an incumbent trial examiner at the Department
of Agriculture; Paul Porter for an incumbent trial examiner at the Department of Ag-
riculture; William E. Leahy and Ben Ivan Mfelnicoff for incumbent trial examiners at
the Department of Agriculture, in the Alcohol Tax Unit and at the Federal Power
Commission; Charles A. Horsky and John R. Thompson for seventeen incumbent trial
examiners at the NLRB; and R_ Granville Curry for twelve incumbent trial examiners
at the Interstate Commerce Commission.
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to prevent bias and prejudice from affecting its decisions. He did not
deny that bias, prejudice and incompetence existed in the Board of
Examiners.
Seventeen hearing examiners from the NLRB had reconsideration
interviews.-" The results of the reconsideration, which with one ex-
ception were approved without review by the Civil Service Commis-
sion, were announced about June 10, 1949. Of the seventeen who were
reinterviewed, eight (instead of the five Mr. McFarland had men-
tioned were still "in trouble") were found still completely disqualified.
One was told that there had been a clerical error and he had really
been qualified from the first. Three war service or temporary incum-
bents were found qualified at very low ratings or at grades below their
present rank. One status incumbent was found qualified for a P-5
position, although the lowest grade held by a hearing examiner in the
NLRB is a P-6.
Also, the Board of Examiners reversed itself with regard to the
Chief Trial Examiner and two Associate Chief Trial Examiners.
Previously the Board had decided that they were not doing "real
examiner work" and therefore would not be considered incumbents."5
One was rated disqualified and two were rated eligible for registers
with intermediate or low scores. This decision was made in spite of
the fact that these men had competitive status and had heard half as
many cases each year (usually the most difficult ones) as the average
examiner, along with their administrative work of assignment of cases,
supervision of the docket and record-keeping. Furthermore, the deci-
sion of the Examiners had been in plain contravention of Civil Service
Commission Regulation 34.2 (f) which provided that the determina-
tion of whether or not a particular position was a hearing examiner
position was to be made by the Commission's Classification Divi-
sion. 9 On reconsideration the Chief Trial Examiner and two Asso-
ciate Chief Trial Examiners were treated as status incumbents and
found eligible, but only for a lower grade than they were holding.
No decision was announced in one case, probably because there
was then pending in the Supreme Court a case in which a court of
appeals had vacated an NLRB order on the ground that the examiner
57. In addition to the fourteen disqualified incumbents, these included the Chief
Trial Examiner and one Associate Chief Trial Examiner, who possessed civil service
status but had been rated merely for the open competitive register, and the other Associ-
ate Chief Trial Examiner, who had been disqualified. The Chief Trial Examiner and the
one Associate Chief Trial Examiner were told at their interviews that they would be
treated as the other status incumbents, and the one Associate Chief who had been dis-
qualified was told he would qualify and be treated as a status incumbent. Others had
interviews which were similar to their first interview.
58. FIRST REPORT OF THE CONSULTAi4TS 13.
59. FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUA, C. Z1, Part 34.1(F). These Regulations were
issued as of September 23, 1947. 12 FED. REG. 6321-4.
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had shown bias against the company concerned." On June 20, 1949,
the Supreme Court unanimously reversed the court of appeals and
went out of its way to praise the examiner's care and impartiality. 1
A month later this examiner, a war service incumbent, was rated eligi-
ble but at a numerical score probably too low to permit his permanent
appointment.6 2
The overall results of the recommendation appear in Table IV
below. 3 The table reveals that of the fifty-four incumbents absolutely
disqualified on the original decision thirty-one were made eligible on re-
consideration. This left twenty-three still disqualified of which eight
were in the NLRB. 64 In addition a number of non-status incumbents
rated eligible on reconsideration received scores which were so low
that their names would never be reached on the registers.
Soon after the results of the reconsideration had been announced,
counsel for the eight NLRB hearing examiners who were still dis-
qualified were informed that the de ?wvo appellate proceeding would
be held on successive days starting on June 20, 1949, which was only
seven working days later. In this limited time counsel were expected
to prepare seven full appeals 66 notwithstanding the fact that they
had been told not to collect evidence until after the reconsideration
had been completed. Counsel, of course, immediately protested. They
contrasted this short time with the year which it took the Commission
merely to provide for conditional reappointment of incumbents, with
the fourteen months which it took the Board of Examiners to do their
original job (January, 1948 to March, 1949), and with the three years
which had elapsed since the Administrative Procedure Act had been
60. Pittsburgh Steamship Co. v. NLRB, 167 F.2d 126 (6th Cir. 1948). Since the
examiner's first interview suggested that this decision was the main thing the Board of
Examiners held against him, the examiner requested that the Board make no determi-
nation of his qualifications until the Supreme Court had disposed of the case. In contrast
to its later action when the examiner had counsel, the Board ignored the request.
61. NLRB v. The Pittsburgh Steamship Co., 337 U.S. 656 (1949).
62. The examiner's counsel immediately sent a blistering protest direct to the three
Civil Service Commissioners. They asked that his score be raised to 95 or that he be
given a prompt and open hearing before the Board of Appeals and Review together with
information of what objective factors, if any, were considered in the rating process and
how the application of those factors resulted in such a low score. Shortly thereafter the
Commission raised his score to 95.
63. Upon occasion the Board has said that it made no recommendations of ineligi-
bility-that it merely passed on to the Commission without recommendation those whom
it did not find qualified.
64. These figures are somewhat deceptive, because a few of the appellants were
cleared on reconsideration by the fact that some time had elapsed since the Board of
Examiners had tallied the incumbents' years of specialized experience and the incum-
bents had been building up time on the job.
65. One disqualified trial examiner was not represented by Attorneys Horsky and
Thompson.
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passed and the Commission had received whatever responsibilities it
had in the selection process. Although counsel insisted that it was
impossible to prepare an adequate appeal in the period allowed, the
Commission adamantly refused any extension.
So that they might prepare cases and establish the procedure, coun-
sel asked that appellants be furnished, before their hearings, with
further particulars as to the reasons for their disqualification and the
precise evidence which the Commission considered adverse to them;
that a stenographic transcript be made at the hearings; that the Com-
mission make available to appellants the subpoena power and inform
them that it would pay witness fees as established in United States
courts; 11 and that the "Basis of Findings" of the Board of Examiners
66. Section 11 of the Administrative Procedure Act gives the Commission power to
issue subpoenas and pay witness fees "for the purpose of this Section." 5 U.S.C. § 1010
(1946).
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be ignored in the proceeding before the Board of Appeals and Review
because it was tainted with the bias and prejudice of the Board of
Examiners. The Civil Service Commission denied all these requests.?
In the matter of a transcript, the Federal Personnel Manual states
that a transcript is "usually" made of any hearing before the Board of
Appeals and Review.68 In denying transcripts President Harry Mitch-
ell stated that the Commission did not have adequate stenographic
facilities available at that moment. When the appellants offered to
bring their own stenographers the Commission still refused, without
giving any reasons.69
Denied the subpoena power, counsel for appellants sent form letters
to the appellants' past and present superiors and associates, and to
NLRB, company, and union lawyers who had appeared before them.
Most of the responses had not arrived by the date of the hearings, but
an arrangement was made to send to the Board of Appeals and Review
photostatic copies of letters as they were received. These letters were
almost uniformly favorable.
The hearings before the Board of Appeals and Review occurred
from June 20 to June 27, 1949.70 All of the cases involved the exam-
iners' "overall characteristics." Four of them also raised questions of
whether experience in non-examiner positions in the NLRB should be
counted as "specialized experience."
Counsel opened the week by presenting written and oral evidence
by members and high officials of the NLRB to orient the Board of
Appeals and Review on the organization of the Board, the functions
of each component part, and the way in which each case 71 progressed
through the NLRB.
67. Counsel were informed by Chairman Edwards that the "Basis of Findings"
(prepared as a Bill of Particulars to explain the reasons for disqualification) would be
the fundamental framework upon which he would conduct his hearings. These rather
indefinite Bills of Particulars would provide the only information as to the allegations
which the appellants and their counsel would have to meet. However, further particulars
would be read from the record, that is, the Civil Service Commission investigator's re-
port, at the time of the hearing and not before.
68. FmzAL PEasoxNFx. fAUAL, c. A5-5.
69. Permission was given to counsel to dictate a "record" after the hearing, this
record to be agreed upon by counsel and the Board of Appeals and Review. On the first
day of the hearings the Board subsequently agreed to tell counsel, after the hearings,
which decisions might be affirmed and to allow counsel to submit their version of the "rec-
ord" and a brief on each. Counsel therefore spent each evening dictating that day's record.
They were never told, however, that any single disqualification was likely to be affirmed.
70. The Board sat as a panel of three consisting of Chairman John F. Edvards,
Alfred Klein, chief law officer of the Civil Service Commission, designated to sit on the
Board for these cases, and other members of the Board who made up in turn the third
member of the panel. The rotating members who sat in the NLRB appeals were Frank
J. Barley, Harold H. Leich, and David F. Williams.
71. In general the NLRB processes two types of cases: (1) "R" cases, involving
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Next each appellant was put on the stand. As soon as he was sworn
the appellate board read aloud excerpts from the 1948 investigator's
report which the Board of Examiners had used. Also read were ex-
cerpts from a new report-that which an investigator had apparently
made in the week or two before the current hearings. "Someone said
this about you" was approximately the phrase used to acquaint the
appellant and counsel with some of the information, laudatory and
derogatory, which was in the particular file. Here for the first time
some of the accusations were made known. Counsel were then put to
the task of questioning the examiner without any chance to consult
with him or to investigate the just-revealed derogatory "evidence."
In each case counsel also introduced written evidence showing that the
appellants had received high efficiency ratings during their service
with the NLRB; that neither the NLRB nor the courts had ever sus-
tained a charge of bias against any of them; that each had a very high
record of cases in which the parties had accepted his recommendations
without challenge and of cases in which the NLRB and the courts had
upheld his findings and conclusions against the challenge of a respond-
ent.
After all the appellants had testified, counsel called to the stand a
number of persons whose official duties had brought them into con-
tact with some or all of the appellants and their work. Included among
those who appeared were a former chairman of the NLRB, two ex-
General Counsels, a former Assistant General Counsel in charge of
the Review Section, the NLRB's Solicitor and Assistant Solicitor, a
high official in the Enforcement Section, the present Chief Trial Ex-
aminer and his two Associate Chiefs, and the Chief Legal Assistants to
four of the NLRB members. Each was queried first about the spe-
cialized experience problem and then about the qualifications of the
individual appellants. All testified to the high value to a hearing
examiner of previous experience as an attorney in the Trial Examiner,
Review, or Enforcement Sections of the NLRB and as legal assistant
to an NLRB member. They were unanimous in the opinion that such
experience should count as "specialized." They also testified with
unanimity that the appellants whom they knew were both competent
and impartial examiners.
As the week wore on several things became apparent. One was
that the reports of the first, or 1948, investigation contained serious
misstatements and omissions. In several instances cases were attrib-
uted to* examiners who never had any connection with them. One
appellant was described as the examiner most frequently reversed by
the NLRB; in fact, the hearing showed, his percentage of affirmances
was the highest of any examiner in the Labor Board's employ. Illus-
trative of another examiner's deficiencies, according to one report,
which of two contending unions should be certified to represent a particular bargaining
unit; and (2) "C" cases, involving complaints of unfair labor practices.
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was a recent case in which a court of appeals had vacated an NLRB
order based on his recommendations; the report failed to add that the
NLRB was petitioning for certiorari and there was no follow-up to
show that the Supreme Court subsequently reversed the court of
appeals. Still another examiner was charged with pro-labor bias on
the basis of two rulings which, the report said, were so clearly wrong
that the NLRB summarily upset them; it developed that each ruling
had really been upheld by both the NLRB and a court of appeals.
A second fact which emerged was the marked discrepancy between
the reports of the first and the second investigations. Not only was
the second report generally favorable to the examiners, but, according
to the Board of Appeals and Review, some informants who in 1948
said that a particular examiner was biased in favor of labor did not
repeat the charge in 1949. The Board expressed its disturbance at
these facts and asked counsel to attempt a written explanation.
The requested memorandum opened by saying that it was impos-
sible to do more than speculate about the discrepancies in the absence
of any knowledge of who the informants were who had made particular
statements. Several possible explanations were then suggested.
First, it was stated, the examiners had made very few rulings under
the Taft-Hartley Act at the time of the first investigation. Their
records had been made in the enforcement of the Wagner Act, which
had been directed against industry. They had not yet had an op-
portunity to demonstrate their objectivity by applying the Taft-
Hartley Act. By the time of the later investigation, however, they
had been able to show that whether or not they agreed with the new
Act they would apply it fairly. This, counsel suggested, was the
reason some informants did not in 1949 repeat their charges of pro-
labor bias.
Secondly, the memorandum continued, labor relations had long
been a bitterly controversial field and one in which loose charges of
bias and prejudice have often been made.72 Moreover, there had been
a sharp and acrimonious cleavage within the NLRB with regard to
making changes of policy under the Wagner Act before Congress
72. Counsel illustrated this fact by an e-planation along these lines: In this field a
"pro-labor" accusation is often better evidence of where the accuser stands than where
the accused government official stands. The Wagner Act itself was "pro-labor," and the
appellants had admittedly tried to carry out the Act's policy in their decisions in the
justifiable belief that any change in interpretative policy should come first from the Board
itself and that any basic change in policy should be made by Congress by amending the
statute. However, a difference of opinion on Wagner Act policy does not lead to the
conclusion of bias and lack of objectivity. Yet that is what is often done in this field.
One can believe that adulterated food should not be permitted on the market and attempt
to carry out the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 without being "anti-business."
The analogy is strained only because feelings seldom run as deep in a pure food hearing
as in a labor hearing.
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amended it." The enmity that had thus been aroused, counsel alleged,
was the probable cause of many of the derogatory statements in the
first investigator's report. And they argued that the investigator never
should have solicited views from persons known to be hostile to policies
which it was the examiners' duty to enforce.
To date decisions have been issued in seven of the eight cases. All
seven examiners were found qualified. Five of them had competitive
status and hence are eligible for absolute appointment. The other two
were given numerical ratings just over 80. The eighth examiner had
one of the strongest cases, and it seems almost certain that he too will
be found qualified. If that happens it will mean that the Board of
Examiners will have reversed itself or have been reversed in the case
of all fourteen of the NLRB's incumbent examiners whom it originally
wanted discharged.
General Dissatisfaction with the Results
Dissatisfaction with the actions of the Board of Examiners and the
Civil Service Commission was registered in other quarters than the
NLRB. Twelve incumbent hearing examiners of long service with the
73. The memorandum explained the way this cleavage developed. It was accentu-
ated when Gerard D. Reilly became a member of the NLRB in 1941 and voted to change
many of the Board's policies and to reinterpret the statute and thus became a dissenting
member. Among those who agreed with his views on the NLRB staff was Mr. Robert
Denham, then a trial examiner. This group constantly sought to change the direction of
the NLRB. Some of those among it who were trial examiners attempted to do so by
writing reports contrary to established Board policies. At one time Chairman Millis
had to intervene and issue an instruction to trial examiners directing them to follow the
policies set by the Board. This instruction, dated March 28, 1946, stated in part as fol-
lows: "The Board expects trial examiners not to deviate from Board policies as set in
Board decisions, briefs, and public statements, in their Intermediate Reports .... The
Board welcomes suggestions from trial examiners as to possible changes in Board policy,
but such suggestions shall be made after the Intermediate Report has issued. The Board
does not desire to discuss possible findings or recommendations with individual trial
examiners before such issuance. . . . Trial examiners are, as heretofore, the sole judges
of what findings of fact should be made in their Intermediate Reports." The NLRB
majority felt that, if the trial examiners did not follow the Board policy, the work of tie
NLRB would be so greatly increased as to render implementation of the law extremely
incomplete. Parties would litigate every case, even though all the NLRB precedents were
against them, in the hope that they might get a trial examiner who would hold to the
contrary. The Board itself would have to devote much time to writing opinions, reversing
the trial examiners' reports and explaining that the latter were clearly contrary to the
Board's precedents.
After Mr. Reilly left the Board, he became one of the principal architects of the
Taft-Hartley Act which contained many of the policies he had unsuccessfully urged upon
the Board. The Taft-Hartley Act provided for an independent General Counsel with
broad policy-making powers. Mr. Denham was appointed to that position. A number of
members of the old Reilly-Denham group were appointed to key positions under Mr.
Denham. These are very likely the sources of some of the derogatory statements re-
ported by the first investigator.
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Interstate Commerce Commission were found disqualified and ordered
displaced. As a result the organized bar of the Interstate Commerce
Commission, known as the ICC Practitioners Association, conducted
a referendum of its membershipJ 4 Of the total membership, 70 per
cent voted on the question of whether to petition Congress for an in-
vestigation of the examination of the incumbent hearing examiners.
Of these 98.1 per cent favored an investigation.7 r Accordingly a letter
of protest was sent to numerous congressmen, 76 and in particular a
memorial was given to Senator Olin D. Johnston of South Carolina,
Chairman of the Senate Post Office and Civil Service Committee.n
Two quotations from the article in the ICC Practitioners Journal will
suffice to reveal the strong stand which was taken:
"It seems almost inconceivable that the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act which was intended, among other things, to insure se-
curity of tenure of hearing examiners, and to prevent their re-
moval only after a fair hearing should be so flagrantly violated in
letter and spirit as appears to be true here." 7 8
"Not only does the action complained of do violence to one's
sense of justice and fair play, but the Civil Service Commission's
action is subversive of constitutional guarantees and democratic
principles and ideals. The police state type of investigation has no
place in American institutions. The professional standing (in the
sunset of a life devoted to public service), social and professional
reputation, and the very livelihood of each of these twelve men are
destroyed . . . without the opportunity to know their accusers or
the accusations, much less to confront and cross-examine them." "
The ICC Practitioners at the same time aided the disqualified ICC
hearing examiners in obtaining letters affirming their competence in
their work for use in their appeals.80 On reconsideration ten were
qualified for absolute appointment and only two remained disqual-
ified, and since then the other two appealed and won their appeals.8 '
At the same time, the labor press began to carry articles about the
disqualification of the NLRB trial examiners. These generally charged
that the objective of the Board of Examiners was to replace incumbent
74. For an account of the actions of the ICC Practioners Association see Practi-
tioners Association, Takes Strong Stand Against Cizil Service Commissio 's Attempt to
Discharge 12 Incumbent LC.C. Hearing Examiners, 16 ICC PnAc'rrrionxs J. 706-31
(1949).
75. Id. at 707.
76. The replies are reprinted id. at 711-16.
77. See Senator Wayne Morse's statement about this petition on the floor of the
Senate, 95 CONG. REr. 10835 (August 2, 1949).
78. 16 ICC PacrmO.qssms J. 706 (1949).
79. Id. at 710.
80. Id. at 707.
81. Id. at 889; 17 id. at 30.
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hearing examiners with eligibles who had been highly rated because
they were "safe" for business. Several of the newspaper columnists
reported on the "house cleaning" performed by the Board of Exam-
iners. Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt in her column on May 28, 1949, was
critical of the use of the non-governmental board:
"But to an outsider, such as I am, it is poor administration to
take out of the hands of the people responsible, certain work which
is important and which it would seem should be done by them. I
can't understand why this work should be put into the hands of
an extracurricular group, called in from outside the Government,
which cannot possibly have the experience or the knowledge that
long training in government would give them." 82
By this time members of Congress, assistants to the President, and
the Assistant Solicitor General were asking for the facts. The private
answer of individual Commissioners was that the inequitable results
would be remedied quietly and piecemeal. It was also said or intimated
that the Board of Examiners would be eased out of the picture: the
Board had handled reconsideration of incumbents found completely
disqualified, but the Commission's own staff would get to work right
away reviewing the ratings of all who were eligible but competing with
each other on registers.
The results were three-fold. First, the Commission made minor
changes in the registers. Secondly, it put the registers into effect and
told the agencies that new appointments must be confined to names
certified from the registers. And, thirdly, the Board of Examiners
resigned.
In Congress, dissatisfaction with the delegation of personnel-exam-
ining functions to individuals outside the Federal Service became vocal
when, on August 2, 1949, Senator Wayne Morse introduced on the
floor of the Senate an amendment to the Civil Service Commission's
appropriation section of H. R. 4177, the Independent Offices Appro-
priation Bill for 1950. His amendment provided that the Civil Service
Commission was not to use any of its appropriations for the compen-
sation or expenses of a member of a board of examiners who had not
filed an affidavit that he was not, or had not been within the fiscal
years 1948 or 1949, interested in any proceeding before any federal
agency or any other proceeding to which the United States was a
party.88 In explaining the purpose of his amendment, Senator Morse
briefly spoke of the authority given to the Civil Service Commission
to determine eligibility for hearing examiners and the latter's del-
egation of this function to a group of outside consultants. He termed
82. My Day, May 28, 1949.
83. The amendment can be found in the House of Representatives print of the bill
with the amendments of the Senate numbered, p. 14, lines 12 through 18.
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this delegation "a rather unfortunate incident" of questionable le-
gality8 4 The amendment was adopted by the Senate on August 2, 1949,
but in the House of Representatives it was amended on motion of
Representative Thomas of Texas to prevent a person with immediate
interests in a particular agency from rating personnel in that agency. 5
He may, however, rate personnel of other agencies in whose proceedings
he has not appeared. Thus it was weaker than Senator Morse's orig-
inal amendment which would have prevented the serving on boards
of examiners of a person who had appeared before any agency in any
proceeding. This House substitute amendment was quickly passed by
the Senate,8 and was enacted into law as part of Public Law 266 by
the signature of the President on August 24, 1949.
Meanwhile other members of Congress had become interested in
the results of the Board of Examiners' activities and the charges which
had been made about them from various sources. Senator Johnston,
Chairman of the Senate Committee on Post Office and Civil Service,
became interested initially because of the representations made to him
by the ICC Practitioners Association.Y Later, counsel for some of the
NLRB applicants and incumbents as well as interested attorneys who
had no clients in either category laid before him evidence of alleged
nepotism and favoritism. Included were names of persons who had
obtained very high scores and also were connected in various ways
with members of the Board of Examiners. These specific accusations
were also presented to the Civil Service Commission in support of the
original motion alleging bias and prejudice on the part of certain mem-
bers of the Board of Examiners. On July 28, 1949, Senator Johnston
introduced in the Senate the following resolution, which was referred
to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service:
"Resolved, That the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service,
84. 95 Co.xo. Rxc. 10835 (August 2, 1949).
85. 95 CoNG. REc. 11738 (August 15, 1949). The amendment reads as follows: "No
part of the appropriations herein made to the Civil Service Commission shall be available
... for the compensation of expenses of any member of a board of examiners (1) who
has not made affadavit that he has not appeared in any agency proceeding within the pre-
ceding 2 years, and will not thereafter while a board member appear in any agency pro-
ceeding, as a party, or in behalf of a party to the proceeding, before an agency in which
an applicant is employed who has been rated or will be rated by such member; or (2)
who, after making such affadavit, has rated an applicant who at the time of the rating is
employed by an agency before which the board member has appeared as a party, or in
behalf of a party, within the preceding 2 years; Provided, That the definition of 'agency,'
'agency proceeding,' and 'party' in Section 2 of the Administrative Procedure Act shall
apply to these terms as used herein."
86. 95 CONG. REc. 11679 (August 15, 1949).
87. At this time, Miss Frances Perkins, one of the Civil Service Commissioners, went
to see Senator Johnston about this matter and explained that regular Civil Service per-
sonnel examiners would review the work of the Board of Examiners. Such a separate
review subsequently took place.
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or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is authorized and di-
rected to make a full and complete study and investigation with
respect of activities of the Civil Service Commission in determining
qualifications for appointment of examiners under section 11 of the
Administrative Procedure Act, including the activities of any ad-
visory committee appointed by the Commission pursuant to such
section. The committee shall report to the Senate at the earliest
practicable date the results of its study and investigation together
with such recommendations as it may deem desirable." 81
Subsequently, Senator Johnston drew from the Senate Post Office
and Civil Service Committee a subcommittee to investigate the whole
selection process for hearing examiners. No hearings were held prior
to the adjournment of the First Session of the Eighty-first Congress.
However, the status quo was maintained by a request from the Senate
Post Office and Civil Service Committee that the Civil Service Com-
mission cease certifying names from the five registers for absolute
appointment until an investigation of the hearing examiner situation
had been made.
On December 13, 1949, the Commission confessed error. It formally
announced that the five registers "will no longer be used for absolute
appointment." The Commission, the announcement continued, "has
decided to review the qualifications of all applicants who filed in the
open competitive examination and to conduct investigations in the
cases of those who meet the experience requirements of the examina-
tion announcement." After this is done, the Commission said, "the
entire examination will be re-rated by our examiners." 89
AN EVALUATION OF THE ExAMINATION
The program for determining qualified hearing examiners was
launched over two years ago. Thus far the results have been unworthy
of the effort. The almost total retrenchment from the original action
of the Board of Examiners, culminating in the Civil Service Commis-
sion announcement setting aside the registers, emphasizes the fact that
the Civil Service Commission approached and initially handled the
problem in an indefensible way. Lest this experience be too quickly
forgotten and no lessons learned from it, an underscoring of the obvious
seems in order.
There are two aspects to such an examination. First, even assuming
that the Act was properly interpreted both as regards coverage and
overall rating procedure, there were not adequate safeguards to guar-
antee each applicant a fair determination of his case. The second aspect
88. Sen. Res. 143, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
89. Civil Service Commission Departmental Circular No. 592, Supp. 3 (DC 592, S.3)
(December 13, 1949).
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is broader. The objective of the Administrative Procedure Act was to
draft a formula for securing competent men who would be independent
and free from subservience to the agencies for which they performed
their statutory functions as presiding officers and initial finders of fact.
But "competence" is irrevocably hinged on a determination of qualifi-
cations, and "freedom" is assured only if there is a proper selection
body and provision for careful surveillance.
Absence of Safeguards in the Procedure Adopted
The discretion granted by the Civil Service Commission to the
Board of Examiners to determine "qualified and competent" hearing
examiners was far too broad. Although the Examination Announce-
ment specified ten different rating factors to serve as standards, eight
of these dealt with legal and judicial ability and were so generally
worded that they left much room for subjective application.cl For
example, the "ability to make independent decisions in important mat-
ters," the "ability to be objective and free from influence of any kind
which might affect impartial judgment," and the "ability to handle
difficult situations and to make and effectuate practical solutions to
problems" scarcely provided definite standards or guides to ensure
objective judgment. The overall experience requirement that "appli-
cants must show conclusively" that they are persons of "judicial tem-
perament and poise" also lends itself easily to a subjective evaluation.
This grant of discretionary authority was greatly increased by the
complete lack of any specification of the weight each rating factor
would carry in the total rating. The Board of Examiners chose to lump
together all rating factors and to rate each applicant and incumbent
by a single letter grade.9 Thus vague overall evaluations were sub-
stituted for separate evaluations on each rating factor and became the
determinations of judgment which the Board of Examiners felt should
not be reviewable. Furthermore, any kind of review was made difficult
by the Board's policy of not making adverse findings of fact and not
explaining the reasons for disqualification (except in cases where
specialized experience was lacking).
Among the safeguards should have been a clear regulation concern-
ing disqualification of any member of the Board of Examiners who
had a prejudicial association with an applicant's agency. Instead, each
90. Another rating factor dealt with "diversity of experience in legal proceedings."
This factor was somewhat in conflict with the concept of "specialized experience" and
"progressively responsible experience" set forth in the Announcement, for diversity of
experience is often not obtainable unless frequent job shifts have been made. Strict appli-
cation of this factor would also tend to benefit private practitioners and to penalize gov-
ernment employees, because the latter generally are limited to the functions of a particular
agency.
91. FIRST REPORT OF THE CONSuLTAiN S 13.
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individual member was left free to make this decision. The mere grant
of this discretionary authority in the controversial field of regulatory
administration would undoubtedly have given rise to accusations that
the Board of Examiners departed from traditionally fair standards of
rating personnel. Unfortunately, several activities engaged in by the
Board of Examiners added weight to these accusations. First, the
Board members and the associates carried on recruitment activities
contemporaneously with their examining functions. In addition, the
decisions of the Board of Examiners were made in the vaguest of terms
by the use of the two phrases: "Lack of Sufficient Specialized Experi-
ence" and "Overall Characteristics," and no further explanation for
the disqualifications ever came from the Board.92 Furthermore, the
procedure for reconsidering the disqualified incumbents was not
designed to disprove accusations that the Board was biased and preju-
diced. No use was made of the subpoena power conferred by the
Administrative Procedure Act in order to provide witnesses who could
produce testimony openly and under oath which could be compared
with information gathered in confidence. Nor were counsel for the
disqualified incumbents allowed even to be present at the reconsidera-
tion interview.
As a result of the protestations made by counsel in oral arguments
before the Civil Service Commission, the Commission promised to see
that any bias and prejudice that might have tainted the actions of the
Board of Examiners would be eliminated in the appeal before the Board
of Appeals and Review. However, the procedure used by the Board of
Appeals and Review hampered in a number of ways the adequate
presentation of appeals and was not effectively designed to correct
errors committed at earlier stages in the examinations. First, the time
allowed appellants to prepare for the appeal was limited to one week.
Second, the indefinite "Bases of Findings" were made the only allega-
tions which appellants could prepare to meet. Third, there was no
opportunity to obtain a record of testimony under oath in order to
test the confidential records since the Commission would not supply a
stenographic transcript of the appellate hearings.93 Fourth, the Coin-
92. In Fink v. Finegan, 270 N.Y. 356, 1 N.E. 2d 462 (1936), the New York Court of
Appeals condemned an even less vague reason for disqualification, namely, "lacking in
force and executive ability."
93. Certainly, if the stenographic facilities were not available, this fact was another
reason to delay the proceedings which had been scheduled on such short notice. Further-
more, as has been pointed out, the Commission was denying these incumbent hearing
examiners the normal procedure accorded to appellants before the Board of Appeals and
Review. Yet the various special protections in regard to removal of hearing examiners,
unlike other civil servants, accorded by the Administrative Procedure Act (removal
hearings for hearing examiners were made subject to all the procedural safeguards for
adjudication as required by Section 5) attest to the fact that hearing examiners were to
be treated as special cases in personnel actions. Therefore, if any personnel actions before
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mission denied the appellants the subpoena power and ignored their
petition for payment of witnesses.9 4 Thus they were compelled to rely
only on witnesses who were immediately available. In effect, the only
precautionary action taken by the Commission to ensure an independ-
ent review untainted by possible errors by the Board of Examiners was
the gathering by personnel investigators of a new file of confidential
comments about the incumbents. Significantly these new records were
much more favorable to the appellants than the first ones had been.0
When, in July, 1949, the Civil Service Commission began to review
independently the ratings which had been made by the Board of
Examiners and which, up to that time, had been left exactly as the
Board determined them, the Board was naturally annoyed that the
Commission's staff was undertaking this job on its own. It is thus
understandable that the Board should have decided to resign. How-
ever, the Board's desire not to have its decisions subject to revision is
not compatible with its other contention that as an advisory group of
the Board of Appeals and Review were to be granted a stenographic transcript-and the
Commission's Personnel Manual states that this is "usually" done--hearing examiners
especially should be accorded such treatment. The implication is strong that the Com-
mission was seeking to make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the appellants
to get a full and fair review, by either the Commission itself or later by a court, of any
adverse decisions which the Board of Appeals and Review might make.
94. The Commission's authority to use the subpoena power and to pay witness fees
is contained in § 11 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 STAT. 244, 5 U.S.C. § 1010
(1946). Section 6(c) of the same Act provides: "Agency subpoenas authorized by law
shall be issued to any party upon request and, as may be required by rules of procedure,
upon a statement or showing of general relevance and reasonable scope of the evidence
sought." 60 STAT. 240, 5 U.S.C. § 1005 (c) (1946). Counsel for the appellants, faced
with the difficult task of getting testimony concerning appellants from the many persons
who had supervised or appeared before the appellants, had asked the Civil Service Com-
mission whether it would extend the subpoena power if in each case they made a "show-
ing of general relevance and reasonable scope of the evidence sought." The effect of the
blanket denial was to say that no subpoenas would be issued regardless of -. hat showing
counsel made in individual requests. Up to this time they had been told that collecting hun-
dreds of letters or statements by those who knew of the work of the incumbent examiners
was unnecessary. Now in seven days they were faced with this task.
95. Washington columnist John Cramer, who strangely had private access to the in-
vestigators' records which the Commission refused to release to "anyone" (including the
Senate subcommittee), has quoted from the confidential testimony of some of the NLRB
members in the first investigation and pointed out discrepancies between this and their
testimony in the second investigation. He concluded from this that the NLRB members
were hoping that the Board of Examiners would disqualify a number of their hearing
examiners, but later, when the results of the examination created widespread dissatisfac-
tion, they changed their testimony in regard to the appellants. However, an equally plau-
sible interpretation is that the first interrogation was unfairly conducted and reported.
Only the absolutely disqualified incumbents had a second investigation. It is logical to
assume that similar discrepancies would occur if new investigations were made on other
incumbents who received low scores on the list of eligibles, but such an investigation has
not been made.
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consultants it should not have to take the responsibility for any official
actions in disqualifying and determining rank order. As an advisory
board, it could be free of responsibility for the final decisions, but it
could not then object to the fact that its advice was not taken in all
instances. The Board of Examiners wanted to have it both ways, that
is, to effectuate the outcome of its own actions and to have the Com-
mission take the responsibility therefor in its stead.
Before the resignation, a situation had arisen in which the Board
and the Commission were directly or indirectly casting the responsi-
bility for the results of the examination on each other. The resignation
of the Board of Examiners thus had the effect of placing the respon-
sibility for the rectification of the results of the examination, if any
were to be made, on the Commission, which in reality had to assume
it anyway because the Board of Examiners received its delegated func-
tions from the Commission in the first place.
The Question of Specialized Experience
Administrative agencies have grown up not only because courts
could not handle the volume of adjudication and rule-making required
under modem statutes granting wide discretion to administrative
agencies but also to a greater extent because governmental regulation
requires specialized personnel in the various fields of regulation in-
volved. It is generally granted that specialized knowledge is valuable
for the administrative and prosecuting staff in the regulatory agencies,
but it is a matter of dispute whether such knowledge, previously ac-
quired, is valuable for hearing examiners.
One school of thought looks upon hearing examiners as primarily
judges, who, when presented with the evidence in an administrative
case by the agency's counsel and the respondent's counsel, should
know how to make a determination of facts based upon the weight of
the evidence in the record, apply the law to the facts found, and frame
an appropriate remedy calculated to effectuate the statute being ad-
ministered or enforced. Hence, in this view, the qualifications for the
position are judicial temperament and the ability to judge. Although
the hearing examiner will become familiar with the subject matter and
body of law in the field of regulation in which he participates, a special-
ized background in the field of regulation is not regarded as important.
Some go so far as to advocate an examiners' pool from which an ex-
aminer may be selected for any case throughout the government.
This idea, however, was rejected, when the Administrative Procedure
Act was formulated.9"
The opposing view holds that it is very valuable for hearing ex.
96. "The section [Sec. 11] thus takes a different ground than . . . other proposal
for a completely separate 'examiners' pool' from which agencies might draw for hearing
officers." SxN. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 215 (1946).
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aminers to be thoroughly familiar with a specialized field of regulation
and its law in order that the administrative process can be expeditiously
handled and the regulatory policy effectively carried out; that in fact
an important purpose of the administrative process is to utilize skilled
fact-finders as well as skilled fact-pleaders.
Prior public statements of at least two members of the Board of
Examiners, Messrs. Willis Smith and Joseph XV. Henderson, indicated
that they were extremely hostile to the concept of administrative
adjudication based upon a fund of specialized knowledge. The follow-
ing passage of a speech by Mr. Henderson before the Nebraska Bar
Association is typical:
"You are going to say that there are too many cases, and that our
judges can't handle them. If that is their objection, then I say let's
get some more judges .... All the courts need is a little more
streamlining and they will be able to get things done just as fast
and we'll have better justice when we're through .... I would
still go back to the country doctor and lawyer and pit their knowl-
edge and ability against all these specialists. We don't have to have
specialists decide our cases .... Therefore, let us not be hood-
winked by these people who want to change our form of govern-
ment and get us away from our established form of justice into
these administrative tribunals." 97
It would have been a fair guess that such vigorous views would color
a board's estimate of what are and are not important qualifications.
This indeed is what happened in the Board of Examiners' interpreta-
tion of the standards and experience requirements set forth in the
Civil Service Commission's Announcement. The Announcement stated
that any necessary "general experience" must have been obtained
"through legal practice or technical work performed in a field ap-
propriate to the field in which hearings are conducted .... This
technical work must have provided a working knowledge of rates,
fares, charges and practices of the industry concerned; accounting
systems of the industry concerned; trade, labor or other practices
of the industry concerned." 91
Also one of the rating factors to be considered was the applicant's
"knowledge and experience in the technical subject-matter field in-
volved in the position under consideration." 1 The Board of Ex-
aminers, however, decided that:
"For the lawyer, general experience is the private practice of
his profession as general practitioner or in public service as a
97. 34 PRocanINGs-NERAesxA STATE Btm AssocrATio 49, 53-54 (1943) (re-
printed in 22 Na. L. REv. no. 4 (1943)).
98. EC-17 at 1 (see note 26 .upra).
99. Id. at 2.
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lawyer. For the non-lawyer, general experience must be closely
related to what is hereinafter described as 'specialized experience'
since otherwise the experience requirement would be meaning-
less." 10
Thus the Board of Examiners ruled out any technical knowledge in the
general experience requirement for lawyers, despite the fact that the
Announcement states otherwise. It went on to state that for the "gen-
eral experience," the experience of a lawyer will not suffice if it con-
sists only of "service as a lawyer in positions which may normally be
filled by non-lawyers" or "administrative work or supervision, etc." I"I
Thus lawyers who might have engaged in "technical work performed
in a field appropriate to the field in which hearings are conducted"
were not allowed credit for such technical experience in regulatory
administration.
The specialized experience requirements of the Announcement were
interpreted in an even more unauthorized fashion. The Announcement
stated that the specialized experience had to be obtained in one of sev-
eral categories of listed positions. They included positions as member,
officer, or employee of a governmental regulatory body, who conducted
formal hearings; made or recommended decisions on the basis of the
record of such hearings; was responsible for the preparation or pres-
entation of cases; or had administrative charge and responsibility for
the successful completion of cases conducted before a court of record
or governmental regulatory body. 1 2 The Board of Examiners in its
Rating Schedule for Hearing Examiners 103 listed fifteen types of expe-
rience which were not counted as "specialized." Work as an "inter-
viewer, field investigator, or sleuth" was not so considered, even
though it might well amount to "the preparation . . . of cases" before
a court or governmental regulatory body. "Administrative or super-
visory work connected with public administration or regulation" was
not so considered, even though it might well amount to "administra-
tive charge and responsibility for the successful completion of cases
conducted before a court of record or governmental regulatory body."
"Work as a case or record reviewer of examiners' proposed reports or
initial decisions" was not so considered, even though it might well
amount to "recommended decisions on the basis of hearings."
The Announcement had also stated:
"In addition, the above experience [of one of the specialized cat-
egories] must have included, in the aggregate, participation in a
sufficient number of important cases comparable to those coming
100. FIRsT REPORT OF THE CONSULTANTS 28-9.
101. Id. at 29. ,
102. EC-17 at 2.
103. FIRST REPORT OF THE CONSULTANTS, Exhibit A, 28-31.
lVoL.59:431
1950] SELECTION OF FEDERAL HEARING EXAMINERS 465
before Federal regulatory bodies, to demonstrate a familiarity with
problems which arise in the field of administrative law, and an
ability to deal with these problems in a satisfactory manner." 104
This requirement was applicable to all types of experience cited as
"specialized" in the Announcement. In spite of this, the Board of
Examiners apparently did not apply this requirement to "experience
as a judge, master, referee, hearing officer, or similar official of a court
of record," for they mentioned these positions in their explanation of
specialized experience with merely the qualifying phrase "doing the
kind of work generally associated with typical judicial proceedings"
but without the essential qualifying phrase of participating "in a
sufficient number of cases comparable to those coming before Federal
regulatory bodies." The implication is that judges and officials of a
court of record were considered suitable persons to become hearing
examiners without any experience with respect to cases in adminis-
trative law.
The Announcement had also included in italics at the end of the sec-
tion on "Experience Requirements" the statement that
"Applicants' experience must have demonstrated, in connection
with cases in one or more of the categories described above, a broad
knowledge of the technical, legal, and economic factors likely to be
encountered in such cases. . .. " 105
Notwithstanding this statement and the others which have been
quoted above, the First Report of the Board of Examiners contained
this statement:
"Of course the case of an incumbent or applicant will be aided to
the extent that he can further show either diversity of experience
or broad knowledge of the technical and other special factors in-
volved in his field of special competence. It should be emphasized,
however, that the consultants have sought generally apt, able, and
temperamentally fitted examiners-not specialists in particular
subjects such as radio, railroads, or rates." Ic3
It must be remembered, too, that the Board of Examiners made their
alphabetical ratings on the basis of the rating factors considered as a
whole without determining what ratings would obtain when applicants
were considered in relation to "specific positions" to be filled. The
effect of this procedure was thus to make the loose and subjective re-
quirements of judicial temperament and poise, as viewed by the in-
dividual members of the Board of Examiners, to a very large extent
the only rating factors involved.
104. EC-17 at 2.
105. Ibid.
106. FirsT REPor oF TH CoxsumTANrs 9.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
The Civil Service Commission also helped to de-emphasize the
specialized experience factor by its decision to have a register for each
grade of hearing examiner which would apply to all agencies. Thus an
applicant, qualified because of his specialized experience in cases in-
volving the adjudication of claims for old age and survivors' insurance
benefits, or the settlement of estates of Indians, could be certified to
the NLRB for the position of hearing examiner in cases involving un-
fair labor practices. The Announcement provided for a procedure
which might have avoided such a result. It stated: "As vacancies
occur, the qualifications of the latter group [applicants who meet the
basic requirements] will be evaluated in relation to specific positions to
be filled." 107 However, when the registers were actually made up, the
Commission gave no indication that the eligibles rated in relation to
these general standards of competence would be re-rated in relation to
specific positions. Nor was there any indication that use would be
made of selective certification, which would allow for the certification
of those eligibles who have the specialized experience relevant to a
particular agency's area of activity. 1 1
One of the more amazing consequences of these departures from the
Announcement was a determination by the Board that several incum-
bent hearing examiners were deficient in "specialized experience." A
good argument can be made that "specialized experience" requirements
are unnecessary for incumbents whose work is satisfactory to their
agency since the purpose of having these requirements is to locate men
whose training and background indicate they will probably be good
hearing examiners in a particular field. An incumbent, however, can
be evaluated on the work he has done in the position. This is par-
ticularly true in the case of a hearing examiner, whose rulings and
decisions as a presiding officer are recorded in the transcript of the
hearings and whose findings and conclusions are written and available
in the form of intermediate reports. It should be enough if an analysis
of these documents and the opinion of his superiors indicate that he
has served satisfactorily. As counsel for the NLRB incumbents who
were disqualified for the lack of sufficient specialized experience pointed
out: "To disqualify a trial examiner because he fails to meet certain
experience requirements is comparable to eliminating a successful
college graduate because of supposed deficiencies in his high school
training."
The deficiencies found by the Board of Examiners arose mostly be-
cause certain positions which the incumbents formerly filled were not
counted as specialized experience by- the Board of Examiners. In
particular these positions were (1) attorney in the enforcement divi-
107. EC-17 at 2.
108. Statements made to the author by a member of the examining staff of the Civil
Service Commission.
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sion, (2) review attorney, (3) legal assistant to a board member, and
(4) associate attorney in the trial examining division.
The enforcement attorney has responsibility for informing the
Board as to the advisability of enforcement action in one of the United
States Courts of Appeals and for preparing cases for presentation in
these courts, and, if necessary, in the Supreme Court. In the original
decision the Board of Examiners did not count such experience as
specialized, but reversed itself on reconsideration. No reversal was
made with reference to the other three types of positions. Accordingly
the NLRB protested to the Civil Service Commission. The NLRB
memorandum concluded with these words:
"Consistently with its position here taken, the Labor Board
always deemed the work of the Review and Associate Attorney and
the Legal Assistant as invaluable apprentice training for Hearing
Examiner functions. Indeed, before the passage of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act the Labor Board, as a general rule, required
applicants who lacked such experience to serve a period of in-
service training before being detailed to duty as a Trial Examiner.
Time has confirmed the wisdom of this policy of thus utilizing the
'special competence' developed in the Labor Board's adjudicatory
process to the very best advantage of the Government. Nor do we
believe it necessary to mark the obvious merit of such experience in
this 'special technical field,' when considered in contrast to that
experience gained adjudicating 'claims for old age and survivors
benefits, or the settlement of estates of Indians,' which, to the
extent here involved, in sufficient amount qualified a Hearing Ex-
aminer for assignment to this Board by the standards enunciated in
EC-17." I0
"In sum, it is our firm conviction that experience as a Review or
Associate Attorney or Legal Assistant is the 'specialized expe-
rience' contemplated by EC-17. A contrary interpretation, we be-
lieve, would not only result in injustices to individual applicants,
but would result in an unwarranted dissipation of special compe-
tence, to the Government's present and future detriment." 110
The rejection of the experience gained on the judicial side of the
regulatory process is illustrated by the rating of applicants from the
NLRB's judicial staff of legal assistants. Of the ten known applicants
in this category, none was found qualified by the action of the Board
of,Examiners. Yet these are the men whom the Labor Board (essen-
tially a labor court under the Taft-Hartley Act) had picked to aid them
in making the final decision in cases involving unfair labor practices.
Opposition to the Board of Examiners' definitions of specialized
109. NLRB memorandum to the Civil Service Commission with a covering letter to
the Board of Appeal and Review, 11-12 (July 12, 1949).
110. Id.at 12.
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experience was not confined to the NLRB. The ICC Practitioners
Association took similar exception to these views of the Board of
Examiners. One of the ICC hearing examiners had been informed that
his experience was clerical, since: "You have spent most of your time
in the office of a Commissioner." 111 The ICC Practitioners Associa-
tion replied that those familiar with the organization and functioning
of the ICC know that "the Examiners assigned to assist a Commis-
sioner in his office must be of outstanding ability and competence
since they are relied upon heavily for advice and counsel in the per-
formance of the Commissioner's duties." 112 The article continued:
"These twelve examiners are experts, possessing detailed knowl-
edge of the problems which come before them. Their successors,
should their discharge stand, are unknown and may well be un-
trained, inexperienced, and without understanding of the technical
language and problems which they would be called upon to hear and
decide. The idea, with which the consultants appear to be obsessed,
that a commerce examiner is a mere umpire, or at the most has
functions similar to that of a judge, is fantastic, to say the least.
The judge deals with the finished product-the examiner par-
ticipates in the making, and frequently in the design. No group
of men, however eminent in its own field, is competent to pass upon
the qualifications of such examiners until they, themselves, have
become experts in the field. The logical body to select and direct
ICC examiners is the Commerce Commission." 113
Use of Non-Governmental "Expert" Personnel Examiners
The advisability of employing a board of expert examiners composed
of members outside of the federal service depends on three issues: the
legality of their appointment, their expertise for the job, and the
propriety of choosing attorneys who had represented special interests
before administrative agencies.
Undoubtedly the Civil Service Commission was under much pres-
sure to constitute the Board of Examiners from among persons outside
the federal service and more particularly from those who as critics
of the administrative process had successfully engineered the passage
of the Administrative Procedure Act. However, there were strong
reasons why the Commission should not have consented to a mem-
bership corhposed of attorneys practicing before federal regulatory
agencies. And the legality of their appointment is open to question.
If sworn in as government employees, they would have been forced
to give up their practice before federal agencies while so employed
since the Federal Criminal Code prohibits governmental employees
111. 16 ICC PR~cnTIoNxEs J. 706, 710 (1949).
112. Ibid.
113. Id. at 710-11.
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from engaging in cases against the Government.11 4 When counsel for
the appellants asked for information concerning the employment
status of the Board of Examiners, the Commission refused this in-
formation. Later, in reply to a Senator's letter, the Commission ex-
plained that the members and the associates had not been sworn in
as employees but were serving under contract pursuant to Section 15
of Public Law 600 of the Seventy-Ninth Congress. 11 However, Execu-
tive Order 9830 116 also governs the Civil Service Commission when it
contracts for personnel examiners outside the federal service. Section
01.4(d) thereof reads: "Where qualified examiners are not readily
available in the Federal Service, and to the extent permitted by law,
the Commission or the agency concerned may designate and com-
pensate individuals outside the Service especially qualified by ex-
perience and training to serve as examiners." 11 There is no record
that the Civil Service Commission sought an opinion from the Attorney
General as to the legality of contracting for the services of practitioners
in cases before governmental agencies or that it made a finding that
"qualified [personnel] examiners were not readily available in the Fed-
eral Service." 118 Whether the membership of the Board of Examiners
was legally composed or not, the spirit of the law which prohibits hav-
ing an interest against the Government while performing services for
it and the spirit of the Executive Order which permitted the use of
outside groups only where qualified examiners were not available in
the federal service were disregarded.
The question of expertise is difficult to answer, because it again
114. Sections 281 and 283 are in the new Title 18 of the United States Code and were
enacted into law in 1948 by the 80th Congress, but they were in the former Criminal Code
in substantially the same form. These provide for criminal penalties for aiding in the
prosecution of a claim against the United States or receiving compensation for any
services in relation to a proceeding in which the United States is interested, while serv-
ing as an officer or employee of the Federal Government
115. Act of August 2, 1946, 60 STAT. 810, 5 U.S.C. § 55a (1946). Section 15 provides:
"The head of any department, when authorized in any appropriation or other act, may
procure ... the intermittent services of experts or consultants ... by contract...."
The Independent Offices Appropriation Acts of 1948 and 1949 so authorized the Civil
Service Commission.
116. Exec. Order No. 9830 became effective on May 1, 1947. See FEDE..A PRSouMn
MAN A.4, c. Z1-203.
117. Id. at c. Z1-204.
128. Senator Morse referred to the Commission's action in delegating the function of
examination to a group of outside consultants in the following words delivered on the
-loor of the Senate: "shortly thereafter a question was raised as to the legality of this
action, and it was suggested that the Commission obtain an opinion from the Attorney
General sustaining the legality of its action. Had it done so, I think a rather unfortunate
incident, about which I shall comment very shortly, could have been avoided. But, so
far as I know, the Commission never saw fit to ask the Attorney General to give an
opinion on its original action." 95 CoNG. Rnc. 10835 (August 2, 1949).
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depends on one's view about the specialized character of the adminis-
trative process. The ICC Practitioners Association, as noted above,
contended that the Interstate Commerce Commission alone had the
expertise to rate the qualifications of applicants for ICC hearing ex-
aminers. This view is in opposition to one interpretation of Section 11
of the Administrative Procedure Act, namely, that the Civil Service
Commission is to determine those "qualified and competent" for these
positions. The Commission acted on this latter construction but found
itself lacking in personnel examiners who were specialists in adminis-
trative law. Although it had some lawyers on its staff, they could not
function as personnel examiners of applicants for attorney positions
in the federal service because Congress had consistently since 1943 in-
serted in the appropriation act for the Civil Service Commission:
"No part of the appropriations herein made to the Civil Service
Commission shall be available for the salaries and expenses of the
Legal Examining Unit in the Examining and Personnel Utilization
Division of the Commission, established pursuant to Executive
Order Numbered 9358 of July 1, 1943." 119
But even though the Civil Service Commission did not have experts
in administrative law on its own staff, the different federal regulatory
agencies had many such persons. These might very well have consti-
tuted a panel of personnel examiners for the position of hearing ex-
aminer. Indeed such a panel was constituted in the form of the original
Advisory Committee which the Civil Service Commission set up pur-
suant to Section 11 of the Administrative Procedure Act. This Ad-
visory Committee was, however, superseded by the Board of Exam-
iners for Hearing Examiner Personnel which did not include in its
membership a single expert in federal administrative law from the
federal regulatory agencies.
Outside of the federal service, experts in administrative law are most
likely to be found among persons who have studied intensively the
federal regulatory process. They would include certainly members of
the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure.
However, only one of these members, Mr. 'McFarland, was placed on
the Board of Examiners and he had joined in the so-called minority
report of the Committee which the American Bar Association sup-
ported. However, none of the members who joined in the majority
report without presenting additional views were made members of the
Board of Examiners. Lloyd K. Garrison, Ralph F. Fuchs, Henry M.
Hart, Jr., and Harry Shulman were members of this majority group of
seven. If experts from outside the federal service are to be used at all, it
would seem advisable to include at least one of the majority group.
But all those mentioned are "school-men" whom the controlling leader-
119.. Independent Offices Appropriations Acts 1944-50. E.g., 61 STAT. 585 (1947).
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ship of the American Bar Association did not think were as qualified
as practitioners.
Practitioners are also a potential source of experts in administrative
law. But if they are to be included on a board of personnel examiners
for federal regulatory positions, they should not be drawn from those
who serve business and industry alone. Excluding Mr. McFarland's
representation of some of the Railway Brotherhoods in injunction pro-
ceedings, the principal clients of the three practitioners on the Board
of Examiners came from this segment of economic life. In the member-
ship of the Board, the government's regulatory agencies, the public,
and competing political and economic interests were left without a
voice.
But a wider representation of special interests would not really solve
the problem and would indeed complicate it. Representatives or asso-
ciates of any special interest group-be it business, labor, or agricul-
ture-are bound to be suspected of partiality. Moreover, it is almost
impossible to compose an adequate balance of immediately involved
special interests on any panel. In effect, a board of experts composed of
the various groups interested in regulation would become a battle-
ground for conflicting interests rather than an effective device for the
selection of hearing examiners. Furthermore, use of representatives
of a special interest group to function as a board of expert examiners
compromises the agency which uses them, generates counter pressures,
and weakens that agency's ability to administer its duties objectively
and impartially.
Since the Administrative Procedure Act entrusted to the Civil
Service Commission the authority to determine the compensation of
incumbent examiners and thus to make promotions (in order to free
the hearing examiners from subservience to their agencies), any group
to whom the Commission delegated these tasks would be responsible
for periodically rating the work of each examiner by reviewing his
findings and conclusions in his intermediate reports. If such a group
then were composed of persons with a private and special interest,
the way would be open for this private interest to penalize examiners
by preventing the promotion of examiners who had rendered reports
unfavorable to them. Interested parties would look over the shoulder
of a hearing examiner as he wrote every report, as he made every resolu-
tion of the credibility of witnesses, and as he made every ruling about
the admissibility of evidence and the conduct of the hearing. If these
decisions turned out to be unfavorable to the special interest, the
representative of that special interest on the rating board would be so
informed. In effect, subservience to the agencies would thus have been
replaced by a potential subservience to the litigants-a result hardly
calculated to produce an independent corps of administrative judges
and certainly outside the intent of Congress in enacting the law.
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The solution to this type of subservience is to exclude from rating
boards for regulatory personnel any persons who are interested, pecun-
iarily or otherwise, in proceedings involving federal regulatory agencies.
Senator Morse's amendment, which sought to create such a result, was
eminently sensible, and the substitute amendment which was finally
passed is helpful in excluding persons immediately interested in a
particular agency. 120
Because it is difficult to find such disinterested persons outside the
Government (except, of course, for professors who are always open
to the charge of being impractical theorists), the most feasible alterna-
tive is the use of experts in administrative law from other agencies of
the Government. In this way hearing examiners will not be sub-
servient either to the staff of the agency whose cases they hear, which
subservience the Administrative Procedure Act intended to remove,
or to outside private interests, which subservience the whole concept
of the public interest in the administrative process opposes.
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION As A GUARANTOR OF THE INDE-
PENDENCE OF HEARING EXA!1INERS
When Congress was considering what kind of agency should be
entrusted with the authority of selection, compensation and removal
of hearing examiners, it had three proposals before it. One was that
of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure
which recommended the creation of an Office of Federal Administra-
tive Procedure. The Office was to consist of (1) a Director appointed
by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,
(2) a Justice of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia designated by that Court's Chief Justice, and (3) the Direc-
tor of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts.'21 This
Office was to be given responsibility for the appointment of hearing
examiners (the Committee used thie term "commissioners") according
to the following language of the Committee's proposed bill:
"He [the hearing examiner] shall be nominated by the agency,
and shall be appointed by the Office of Federal Administrative Pro-
cedure if that Office finds him to be qualified by training, experience
and character to discharge the responsibilities of the position." 12
Under this proposed procedure the agency would select anybody it
wished, but the appointment would follow only if the Office of Federal
Administrative Procedure gave its approval. There would be no ranked
register of qualified applicants as under the Civil Service Commission's
120. See note 83 supra.
121. Final Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure,
SEN. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 193 (1941).
122. Id.at 196. Section 302(3).
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procedure, and the agency would presumably have much more chance
of adding to their staffs specialized hearing examiners.
Under this plan the hearing examiner would hold office for seven
years and then would have to be renominated by the agency and re-
approved by the Office of Federal Administrative Procedure. The
minority report of the Attorney General's Committee accepted this
scheme but extended the term to twelve years and provided that re-
appointments could be made by the Office without recommendation
or intercession of the agency concerned. 23 These amendments were
designed to remove the threat of subservience to the agency on the
part of the hearing examiner because of his desire for renomination at
the conclusion of his seven-year term. Both the majority and the
minority of the Committee agreed that removal should be made only
for cause proved to the Office of Federal Administrative Procedure at
a hearing in which either the agency itself or the Attorney General
would prefer the charges.
The objections to the creation of an Office of Federal Administrative
Procedure were that it would constitute another administrative agency,
would be political, would interfere with the independent operation of
regulatory boards and commissions, would constitute a super-adminis-
trative agency, and would serve unduly to emphasize and channel
complaints respecting the administrative process.12 4
The second proposal provided for appointment by the Judicial Con-
ference of a Director of an Office of Administrative Justice, who, with
the advice and consent of the agencies concerned, would appoint (and
fix the pay compensation of) competent hearing examiners. The Di-
rector would have the power to suspend or remove the examiners and
would by rule regulate the conduct of examiners. The examiners
would have the same security of tenure as is provided by the civil
service laws. The objections to this scheme were that it would remove
the examiners from real responsibility to the agency charged with the
administration of law.
In preference to either of these proposals, Congress chose the third
proposal of using the Civil Service Commission. The concepts that
seemed to be predominant in congressional thinking were (1) that the
agencies "have a proper part to play in the selection of examiners in
order to secure personnel of the requisite qualifications," 125 and (2)
that the guarantee of security of tenure by the Civil Service Commis-
sion was the appropriate way to ensure that the examiners would be
123. For additional views and recommendations of Messrs. McFarland, Stason and
Vanderbilt, see id. at 221-3, 237-9.
124. Sx. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1946).
125. Statement in Congressman Francis E. Walter's extended remarks in the House
of Representatives, May 24, 1946, reprinted id. at 371.
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free from subservience to their agencies. Representative Walter re-
marked:
"However, once selected, under this bill the examiners are made
independent in tenure and compensation by utilizing and strength-
ening the existing machinery of the Civil Service Commission ...
If there be any criticism of the operation of the civil-service system,
it is that the tenure security of civil-service personnel is exagger-
ated. However, it is precisely that full and complete tenure security
which is widely sought for subordinate administrative hearing
and deciding officers. Section 11 thus makes use of past experience
and existing machinery for the purpose." 12
As to the second congressional objective of tenure security, it is
impossible to evaluate the two years of administration of Section 11
by the Civil Service Commission, because absolute appointments to
hearing examiner positions as constituted by the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act have just begun to be made. As to the first congressional
objective of giving the agencies a part to play in the selection of hearing
examiners in order to secure personnel of requisite qualifications, the
conclusion has been reached that the Civil Service Commission and its
agent, the Board of Examiners, handled this assignment in a way which
was very likely to undermine the specialized character of the admin-
istrative process and the forthright and honest execution of federal
regulatory policies.
The effect of forcing the agencies to choose one of three non-special-
ized lawyers who have been given high ratings by the Board of Exam-
iners, along with the displacement of experienced incumbents found
disqualified by the Board of Examiners even though not found to have
been biased or incompetent by their agencies or the courts, is necessarily
to make federal regulation much slower and much less effective. This
would be true not only because of the lack of experience of the new
incumbents but also because of the fear of all incumbents of jeopard-
izing their promotion by impartially applying the regulatory statute
they administer. An attempt to relax the effectiveness of federal
regulation, although it can be legitimately sought by means of sub-
stantive changes in the statutory authority of the regulatory agencies,
should not be camouflaged under the guise of an "improvement" in
personnel. Whether the actions of the Civil Service Commission and
the Board of Examiners were in fact such a subtle and adroit collateral
attack on the effectiveness of federal regulatory activity or merely an
honest attempt to secure competent personnel is not of consequence
here. What is important is that these actions were likely to bring bad
results.
Until last December the Commission publicly defended in loto all
126. Ibid.
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the actions of the Board of Examiners. Apparently it then hoped to
placate its critics and avoid embarrassment by rectifying individual
ratings. That was clearly not enough. The registers were necessarily
affected throughout by the Board of Examiners' misconceptions about
specialized experience, its disregard of the rating standards set forth
in the Examining Circular, and its one-sided composition.
The Commission's eventual decision to discard these registers and
proceed anew was a necessary first step. The next should be an
immediate request to the Attorney General for an opinion on the
limits of the Commission's authority in the selection process. Should
that opinion coincide with the view heretofore taken by the Com-
mission, several procedural changes would be vital. If registers are
still to be used, separate ones should be established for each field of
specialized regulatory subject matter; the subpoena power rather than
assurances of non-disclosure should be relied upon to elicit information
from reluctant witnesses in the course of the new investigations; the
agencies should be allowed to appoint any applicant found to be "qual-
ified and competent" instead of being arbitrarily restricted to the top
segments of the registers.' 2 7 Also the Commission's announced in-
tention of entrusting to its own staff examiners the task of rating the
new examination seems inadvisable. The staff cooperated with the old
Board of Examiners; and staff decisions are almost sure to elicit
charges, justified or not, that the new examination is just window-
dressing. Furthermore, it is at least questionable whether the staff
examiners are as well qualified to establish the competence of hearing
examiners as would be a board of professional experts in administrative
law drawn from the regulatory agencies.
The Commission's December decision, however reluctantly made,
restores its freedom of action. Opportunity to promote the public
interest has replaced the temptation to contrive petty ways of muddling
through and saving face. And the three Commissioners' unhappy ex-
perience in the preceding nine months should be ample notice that there
are persons in and out of the government ready to devote time and
effort to make sure that the hearing examiner program is truly con-
ducted in the public interest.
127. This selection method may raise technical problems with regard to statutory
preferences for veterans. These problems, however, should not have any bearing on the
substance of the proposals here advocated.
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